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ABSTRACT 
 
The Infinite in Early Modern Philosophy: Berkeley’s Objections to the Calculus 
and the Implications for Realism in the Philosophy of Mathematics 
 
The calculus was developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order 
to solve certain mathematical problems. In ‘The Analyst’ Berkeley gave his objections 
to the calculus. In particular, he objected to its dependence upon infinitesimals. He 
argued that these infinitely small distances were contradictory. Further he objected that 
the calculus, despite leading to true conclusions was not genuine science. So, although 
the calculus worked, it raised philosophical problems. 
I will look at Berkeley’s objections, both logical and metaphysical and explore 
how philosophically problematic they are. I will then consider what consequences arise 
from these objections. Specifically, I will look at the consequences for mathematical 
realism, and aim to answer the following questions: 
If Berkeley’s philosophical arguments are valid how can we explain that the 
calculus enables us to derive useful results? If we rely on non-entities such as 
infinitesimals in our mathematical proofs, does this mean that platonism cannot be the 
true metaphysical framework? If we reject platonism, does the dependence upon non-
entities in the proofs of the calculus mean that all forms of mathematical realism are off 
the table? Or, is this methodology consistent with non-platonic forms of mathematical 
realism such as truth-value realism. Or, must we look to an alternative picture, such as 
fictionalism?  
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The Infinite in Early Modern Philosophy: Berkeley’s Objections to the Calculus 
and the Implications for Realism in the Philosophy of Mathematics 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
 The early modern period was a time of great scientific (including mathematical) 
and philosophical development. One of the major achievements was the invention of the 
calculus, which was a considerable breakthrough in the solution of certain mathematical 
problems. However, Berkeley, a leading empiricist philosopher of the period, raised 
certain objections to the methodology of the calculus, specifically to its utilisation of 
infinitesimals, differences which are infinitely small. These objections were of both a 
metaphysical nature (as to the ontological status of these entities) and of a logical nature 
(as to their coherence or lack thereof in the proofs of the calculus). Further, the calculus, 
despite leading to true conclusions was not, according to Berkeley, genuine science. So, 
although the calculus worked, it raised various philosophical problems. 
 
 In the course of this thesis I shall look at the methodology of the calculus and 
describe and assess Berkeley’s philosophical objections to it, and explore how far-
reaching they are. I will then consider what consequences arise from these objections. 
Specifically, I will look at the consequences for mathematical realism and evaluate three 
leading positions from the contemporary metaphysics of mathematics to investigate 
whether any of them can answer Berkeley’s objections.  
 
In chapter 2, I research the history of the calculus as developed by Newton and 
Leibniz in separate but contemporaneous endeavours. In my introduction of the calculus 
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I talk briefly about why it was such an important mathematical development. I then go 
on to discuss the bitter priority dispute fought between Newton and Leibniz in their 
attempts to be recognised as the sole inventor of the calculus. In the course of this 
historical discussion I mention some of the wider philosophical output of both 
protagonists, and other philosophical disagreements which they have had. I briefly 
discuss their differing approaches to the calculus, as well as giving an account of the 
priority dispute itself. Then the methodology of the calculus is explained and an 
example is given from Newton’s calculus.  
 
In chapter 3, I introduce Berkeley’s principal objections to the calculus. These 
form three basic patterns: metaphysical objections, logical objections and a 
compensation of errors thesis. The metaphysical objections deal with the nature of 
infinitesimals, and the primary focus is on the fluxions of the Newtonian calculus. 
Berkeley argues that fluxions are not finite, and are therefore inconceivable. He believes 
that it is hard enough to conceive of the smallest distance or time, and that it is 
impossible to conceive of increments of space and time before they become finite. The 
logical objections analyse two of Newton’s proofs and it is argued that these proofs treat 
an infinitesimal as both having and lacking a quantity. The first proof breaks a standard 
rule for finding the difference in areas between shapes, and results in a different answer 
from the accepted one. The fact that it is different by an infinitesimal amount is not 
deemed acceptable as an explanation. The second proof contains premises that assume 
that the quantity of an infinitesimal is both greater than and equal to zero. As both 
premises can’t be true the proof is flawed. The compensation of errors thesis argues that 
the calculus only yields true results due to the fact that there are two compensating 
errors in some of the proofs. In essence two of the expressed quantities in the proof are 
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too large to the same degree, but they cancel each other out in the course of the 
calculations of the proof. For this reason, Berkeley argues that the calculus can get at 
truth, but not science. I then go on to argue that these objections raise some interesting 
metaphysical questions about the workings of the calculus, and more broadly about the 
nature of mathematical objects, (which I further address in chapter 5 of the thesis.) The 
chapter finishes with a brief look at some objections from Berkeley’s contemporaries 
and his response.  
 
In chapter 4, I look at Berkeley’s motivations for raising the objections to the 
calculus. At least some of the motivations for raising the objections come from his 
broader philosophical outlook and his philosophy of religion. Firstly, Berkeley was 
concerned that some mathematicians had rejected the principles of Christianity, and 
some of their admirers were following suit. This rejection had been put forward on the 
grounds that the principles were incoherent, and Berkeley wanted to show that 
mathematics was not always metaphysically and logically so sound either. This strategy 
then could be used to argue that there was no greater reason for accepting mathematical 
truths than for accepting the principles of Christianity. The second motivation comes 
from Berkeley’s brand of idealism; immaterialism. Berkeley believed that the world 
was essentially immaterial and that there was a (finite) limit to how small anything 
could be. Infinitesimals presented a problem for these beliefs. The third thing to 
consider is Berkeley’s anti-abstractionism and the notion that abstract entities don’t 
exist, and finally we look at his acceptance of the use of other mathematical entities that 
can be deemed to be at least as problematic: imaginary numbers.  
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In chapter 5, I introduce the modern debate about realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics and discuss three leading metaphysical positions; platonism, which accepts 
the existence of mathematical objects, fictionalism, which does not and truth-value 
realism, which is agnostic on the question. I briefly explain each position, first 
generally, and then consider how it may deal with infinity and infinitesimals more 
specifically. Next, I present some initial observations about how each position may be 
applied to the objections. I then go on to analyse the three positions, firstly in terms of 
Berkeley’s underlying motivations, and then in terms of his objections themselves. I 
argue that none of the positions are wholly compatible with Berkeley’s immaterialism, 
with the possible exception of fictionalism.  
 
Turning to the objections, I argue that platonism fails to overcome both the 
metaphysical and logical objections, but does not specifically address the compensation 
of errors thesis. With fictionalism, the metaphysical objections are solved, but the 
logical objections still present a problem for the consistency of the ‘story’ of 
mathematics. The compensation of errors thesis, is, I argue not a problem for some 
varieties of fictionalism, which allow that some of the assumptions we build into our 
scientific theories are known to be not actually true, although there may be other 
difficulties. Truth-value realism, too, can cope with the metaphysical objections; it is 
ontologically neutral, so does not require the existence of mathematical entities. The 
logical objections remain problematic, for similar reasons than have been found in the 
case of fictionalism. It is less clear whether the compensation of errors thesis can be 
handled by truth-value realism, as the position makes no obvious provision for it. 
Finally, therefore, I conclude that while the compensation of errors thesis is only 
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directly tackled by one approach, the metaphysical objections can be solved by two 
approaches, but that the logical objections potentially remain an obstacle for all three.  
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2. The Calculus: 
 
The calculus was developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
independently by both Newton and Leibniz, in order to solve certain mathematical 
problems, and, especially in Leibniz’s characterisation, it utilises infinitesimals. 
(However, the use of infinitesimal slices actually goes back to Archimedes who utilised 
them to calculate the volume of a sphere.)1 The problems the calculus was designed to 
solve fall into two groups. The first relates to the measurements of curves: how to 
determine the area of curved figures, how to determine the slope of a tangent to a curve 
at a point, etc. The second relates to the idea of the continuous variation of one quantity 
with respect to another: how to analyse this variation, how to determine its rate, etc. An 
example of this continuous variation, given by A. W. Moore, is that if one object moves 
away from another, while constantly accelerating, then both its distance from the other 
object and its speed increase continuously with respect to time.2 
 
The calculus was a considerable advance on what had gone before. Prior to its 
discovery solutions to such problems relied upon the theory of ratios and proportions 
found in Euclid, and would involve taking a given magnitude and constructing another 
magnitude bearing the desired ratio to it. This approach was finitistic in character and 
thus prevented the use of infinitesimal magnitudes. This gives rise to the method of 
exhaustion, whereby an unknown ratio between two magnitudes is determined by 
considering sequences of known quantities approximating the unknown to within a 
desired degree of accuracy. Such a technique is employed, for example, in the Euclidian 
proof that the ratio between the areas of two circles is the same ratio as the square of 
                                               
1 Ian Stewart, From Here to Infinity: A Guide to Today’s Mathematics, Third Edition, (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.70-78 
2 A. W. Moore, The Infinite, Second edition, (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 57 
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their diameters. But this method has limitations, which make it difficult to apply to 
more complex curves, and these limitations inspired mathematicians to develop 
infinitesimal methods such as the calculus.3 
 
2.1 The History of the Calculus: Newton, Leibniz and the Priority Dispute:  
 
While it is now received wisdom that Newton and Leibniz invented the calculus 
independently of each other, this was not always the case. During their lifetimes, and for 
a period after, the credit for its invention was hotly contested between the two 
mathematicians and their followers, culminating in a priority dispute, which saw the 
Royal Society crediting Newton (who was by then its President) as the sole creator, in 
1712. Although each man developed his own distinctive versions of the calculus they 
were both drawing on the work of other mathematicians who had gone before them, in 
particular Descartes and Fermat. Newton made his discoveries in the mid-1660s, about a 
decade before Leibniz, and completed most of a treatise-length account by 1671,4 but 
Leibniz was first to publish. Leibniz published a brief outline in 1684, and Newton in 
1704 (appended to his Optiks).5 There were differences in their approaches, but both 
versions of the calculus were reliant on infinitesimals, which were disputed 
philosophically, not least, as we shall see in this thesis, by George Berkeley. There had 
also been some communication between them (some of which would become key 
material drawn on in the dispute), and therefore each was, at least to some degree, aware 
of the other’s work in the field. Ill-feeling between Newton and Leibniz had been 
                                               
3 Douglas M. Jesseph, Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), pp. 124-129 
4 George Smith, "Isaac Newton", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/newton/ 
(Accessed 7 October 2015) 
5 A. Rupert Hall, Philosophers At War: the Quarrel between Newton and Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. xii 
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brewing for some time, but this escalated after John Keill, a follower of Newton, wrote an 
article, which appeared in Philosophical Transactions in 1710, a journal which would go 
on to publish Newton’s review of the Royal Society’s report, in which he accused Leibniz 
of plagiarising Newton, prompting Leibniz to seek redress.6  
 
The dispute was situated in a very individualistic time when scientific prowess 
was rigorously defended, and achievements thought of as being purely a matter of 
personal merit, rather than being a social phenomenon. (Some institutions such as the 
Collège Royale in Paris even encouraged fierce competition where to be defeated in an 
argument could lead to one losing one’s academic post.) The phenomenon of 
convergence, which recognises that it is in fact quite common for more than one scholar 
to arrive at an independent solution to the same problem in identical or closely similar 
ways, was not recognised at the time, despite its inevitability in an active research 
programme. All this meant that priority disputes over scientific and mathematical 
discoveries were quite common. Further, many people were working in this area, trying 
to find solutions to such problems as the general method of tangents and the quadrature of 
particular curvilinear areas, which the calculus was designed to solve. The dispute was 
however quite shocking at the time, due to the monumental status of the two protagonists, 
but it appears even more shocking to us today.7 
 
2.1.1 Newton: 
  
Newton of course is remembered primarily as a mathematician and a physicist, 
but his contribution to philosophy should not be understated. Janiak discusses his 
                                               
6 Smith 
7 Hall, pp. 3-7 
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importance to philosophy and of philosophy to his work. Firstly, Newton was working 
within the tradition of natural philosophy (before the notion of a physicist had been 
employed), which at the time was engaged in overthrowing many of Aristotle’s ideas 
about the natural world, as well as the techniques employed by Aristotelians, and 
developing new mathematical, conceptual and experimental methods. Secondly Janiak 
tells us that Newton’s work had a profound effect on eighteenth century philosophers, 
such as Berkeley and Hume. Further, Newton’s most influential work, The Principia, is 
credited with effecting a branching within natural philosophy, which led to the 
development of the two separate disciplines of mathematical physics and philosophy.8 
George Smith also credits Newton’s most influential work, Principia, as giving rise to the 
sub-discipline of philosophy of science.9 Newton’s work on gravity in the Principia, and 
Leibniz’s views on it also came to bear in the priority dispute on the calculus.  
 
Working in Cambridge and Lincoln, Newton began his work on the calculus in 
1665-6, having previously mastered the binomial series expansion, which was an 
important step in this work. The motive for this step came from finding the area of a 
semi-circle, the first of the two types of problems the calculus was designed to solve, and 
his work enabled him to generalise the problem.10 He also applied it to calculating the 
areas of the circle and hyperbola in infinite series and obtained expressions in an infinite 
series.11 After turning certain expressions into infinite series he then went on to find the 
                                               
8 Andrew Janiak, "Newton's Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/newton-
philosophy/ 
(Accessed 7 October 2015) 
9 Smith 
10 Ivor Grattan-Guinness, The Norton History of the Mathematical Sciences, (London and New York: W. 
W. Norton and Company, 1998), p. 243 
11 W. W. Rouse Ball, A Short Account of the History of Mathematics, Third Edition (London: MacMillan 
and Co, 1901), pp. 337-338  
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inverse of such series. He also used infinite series to measure the quadrature of curves.12 
A proof for this will be discussed at length in section 2.1 of this thesis. 
 
In his development of the calculus, first he obtained derivatives, went on to 
understand that integration was the inverse of differentiation, began to master the process 
of integration by means of infinite series, and by mid-1665, was setting down the 
standard procedures for integration. He had begun working on the idea of differences, in 
almost the same way that Leibniz later would, but this was dropped in favour of the 
notion of fluxions, a fluxion being a derivative of a continuous function. Hall explains 
that this notion comes from thinking of a variable as flowing from one value to another 
and considering its rate of flow, which is presented as a motion or speed, as opposed to 
thinking of a variable quantity proceeding by many infinitely small steps.13 This fitted 
with Newton’s interest in how the issues related to his scientific discoveries, especially 
his work in mechanics, and thus Newton approached the calculus as applied to motion 
and velocity, describing it as the method of fluxions, defining a fluent as a quantity that 
varies over time and a fluxion as the rate at which it does so.14 Specifically Newton 
imagined a variable as flowing from one value to another and considered its rate of flow 
(a motion or speed). He then went on to write a short memoir ‘How to Draw Tangents to 
Mechanical Lines’. Hall describes the procedure highlighted in the memoir as follows: 
Newton is generalising the Cartesian notion of coordinates so as to make 
the x axis and the y axis both change through infinitesimal intervals of 
time …... Any curve can be simulated by properly matching a changing 
flow of x to another changing flow of y: and if at any instant, we halt the 
double flow, the two (now static) rates define a straight line, which is the 
tangent to the curve at that point.15   
 
                                               
12 William Dunham, The Calculus Gallery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 6-15 
13 Hall, pp.13-14 
14 Moore, p. 64 
15 Hall, p. 14 
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Then Newton went on, in a draft entitled ‘To find the Velocities of Bodies by the 
Lines they Describe’ to define the general rules for finding the fluxions related to given 
equations (the same rule that Leibniz would define as the foundation of the differential 
calculus). At this stage although the word ‘fluxion’ is not used, but the symbol which 
would go on to represent a fluxion, o, is.16  
 
In 1666, a ‘velocity’ becomes a ‘motion’, and all the previous work on the 
calculus gets consolidated into an incomplete 48-page treatise, which Newton dates as 
October 1666. (The term, ‘fluxion’ is still not used). Thus, we have a record of sufficient, 
as then unpublished, documentation to demonstrate Newton’s invention of the calculus 
by 1666, almost nine years before Leibniz.  
 
Shortly after, ‘fluxion’ does begin to appear in his terminology: in 1671, he wrote, 
but again failed to publish, ‘Treatise on the Methods of Series and Fluxions’, the first 
work to explicitly state his concern with the calculus in the title, still a few years before 
Leibniz’s work got going.17 Eventually he publishes ‘On the Quadrature of Curves’ 
appended to Optiks in 1704. 
 
2.1.2 Leibniz: 
 
      Leibniz is best remembered as a philosopher, although his opus encompassed 
many other disciplines including mathematics, and even law. He arrived on a diplomatic 
mission for a four-year stay in Paris in 1673, where he met many leading figures in the 
field of natural philosophy to which he had recently turned after gaining access to some 
                                               
16 Hall, pp 14-15 
17 Hall, pp.17-18 
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modern material. His philosophical work has been described as a reaction to two sets of 
modern opponents: Descartes and his followers, who focused on the Cartesian account 
of corporeal substance, and Hobbes and Spinoza who advanced, or were thought to 
advance materialism, necessitarianism and atheism.18 19 It was in Paris that Leibniz was 
first tutored by Christiaan Huygens (with whom he would go on to have a close 
association) in mathematics, philosophy and physics. And it was in Paris that he was 
able to read the unpublished mathematical manuscripts of Pascal, which inspired his 
differential calculus and his work on infinite series.20  
 
Leibniz’s approach to the calculus was also based on the work of Descartes. His 
interest in the calculus stemmed from his conviction that all change in nature is 
continuous, and thus he had a more analytic approach to the subject. It is his notation of 
the calculus that has survived to be used today.21 
 
Steps en route to inventing and subsequently publishing his work on the calculus 
(again like Newton several years after discovery) included the transmutation theorem 
used to find the area under a curve and the Leibniz series. The Leibniz series applies the 
transmutation theorem to a particular curve: he considers a circle of radius 1 and centre 
(1,0) and lets the curve be the quadrant of this circle, whose area is π/4. This allows him 
via differentiation of the circle’s equation to create the series which sums to π/4.  
 
                                               
18 Brandon C. Look, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/leibniz/ 
(Accessed 7 October, 2015) 
19 Although it is not uncontroversial as to whether either man was truly an atheist, especially in a modern-
day understanding of the term. 
20 Look 
21 Moore, p. 64 
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In 1684, he finally published ‘A New Method for Maxima and Minima and also 
Tangents which is Impeded Neither by Fractional Nor by Irrational Quantities and a 
Remarkable Type of Calculus for this’, his introduction to differential calculus, with a 
paper on integral calculus following two years later.22  
 
2.1.3 The Priority Dispute:  
 
 In addition to the calculus (of which there already had been some murmurings) 
Newton and Leibniz quarrelled on the cause of gravity. Essentially this came down to 
whether the action of one physical object could have an effect on another without any 
physical contact. Newton believed that it could (although for this to obtain a non-
material substance would be needed as an agent to gravity in order that the two physical 
substances could interact23) his work was therefore both ground-breaking and 
controversial. This quarrel was also underpinned by differences in methodology. 
Leibniz was working in what was known as the method of hypotheses whereby the 
hypotheses are given first and observable conclusions were deduced from them, which 
Newton opposed in favour of empirical study (or as Newton puts it in his review of the 
Royal Society’s report ‘experiments and phenomena’) where each element of a theory 
was decided by specific phenomena.24 This quarrel had been the main bone of 
contention between the two protagonists and had been raging since at least 1690,25 long 
before Keill wrote his damning accusation of Leibniz in 1708.  
                                               
22 Dunham, pp. 20-34. Dunham also tells us that Leibniz’s case in the priority dispute was not helped by 
earlier criticism over this series. Unbeknownst to Leibniz, Gregory had already discovered a similar 
series, meaning that Leibniz was already viewed with some suspicion in England.  
23 Isaac Newton, Original letter from Isaac Newton to Richard Bentley, (A 4th letter from Mr Newton), 
The Newton Project, (source 189.R.4.47, ff. 7-8, Trinity College Library, Cambridge, UK, ed. by 
Professor Rob Iliffe, 2007,  http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00258 
(Accessed 24 January 2018) 
24 Janiak 
25 Hall, p. 152 
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Keill’s accusation, which appeared in print in 1710, added fuel to the fire and 
brought the Royal Society into the dispute. In an article in Philosophical Transactions 
entitled ‘On the Laws of Centripetal Force’ Keill wrote:  
‘All these things follow from the nowadays highly celebrated arithmetic 
of fluxions, which Mr Newton beyond any shadow of a doubt first 
discovered, as any one reading his letters published by Wallis will 
readily ascertain and yet the same arithmetic was afterwards published 
by Mr Leibniz in the Acta Eruditorium having changed the name and the 
symbolism’26  
 
It seems likely that Keill was aggrieved by Leibniz’s criticisms of forces of attraction in 
the Acta Eruditorium, of which he himself as well as Newton had been on the receiving 
end.27 It is also apparent that from 1710 the two quarrels would become fused together, 
until and even beyond the Royal Society’s verdict.28  
 
On 21 February 1711 Leibniz wrote a letter to the Royal Society in which he 
demanded that Keill apologise for his accusation. Crucially Leibniz stated that he had 
never heard the name ‘calculus of fluxions’, nor seen Newton’s notation before they 
appeared in Wallis’s Works over a decade after he had published his own work.  
 
An apology, however, was not forthcoming. Newton by now believed that similar 
accusations against him could be found in the pages of Acta Eruditorium,29 and after 
Keill had argued his case he was asked by Newton to vindicate himself in writing, rather 
than apologise. Newton’s prior date of discovery not in doubt, Keill’s justification of his 
accusations of plagiarism relied upon the contents of two letters sent by Newton to 
                                               
26 Hall, p. 145 
27 Ibid 
28 Hall, p.164 
29 Hall, p. 169 
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Leibniz in 1676.30 Crucially neither of these letters contained an explicit theory of 
fluxions, or even mentioned the word. Hall argues that this justification rested on two 
claims. Firstly the letters contained ‘hints’ which were sufficiently understood by 
Leibniz, and it was ‘not contrary to reason that these gave him an entrance into the 
differential calculus’.31 Secondly because his invention of the calculus enabled Newton to 
discuss certain mathematical procedures and examples with Leibniz, these procedures 
and examples would in turn enable a competent person to reconstruct the calculus, from 
which they were descended.32 The first claim was so vague as to be hard to prove, but 
then it was also hard to disprove. The second claim, however, makes an assumption that 
there is only one general rule that could lead to the examples Newton gave in his letters, 
so anyone working backwards would arrive at it. This is by no means certain, and as a 
generalisation, manifestly false and tantamount to saying that it is as possible to deduce a 
general rule from particular cases as it is particular cases from a general rule.33 A copy of 
Keill’s vindication was sent to Leibniz, who not unsurprisingly responded with a second 
letter to the Royal Society, stating that he had never challenged Newton’s right to claim 
the discovery independently, and that Newton should ask Keill to back down. An 
anonymous review of Newton’s tract on quadrature written by Leibniz in 1704 belies this 
claim, however, implying that Newton got the idea from Leibniz.34 In any case by this 
time Newton (who had previously not questioned Leibniz’s independent discovery) was 
undergoing a change of attitude, and he was no longer willing to share the honours.35 
 
                                               
30 Hall, pp. 169-171 
31 Hall, p. 170 
32 Hall, pp. 170-173 
33 Hall, pp. 173-174.  
34 Ball, p. 369 
35 Hall, p. 177 
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Newton presented his side of the story to the Royal Society, claiming his right as 
‘first author’. Notes from a speech indicate that he claimed he had only recently been 
made aware of articles in the Arta Eruditorum, which claimed he had borrowed from 
others, and that he was owed as much of an apology over this as Leibniz was from Keill. 
In a draft, he asserted that Leibniz had learned from the 1676 letters to him that he had 
written a treatise of the methods of converging series and fluxions before he had heard of 
Leibniz’s differential method.36  
 
Following this the Royal Society appointed a committee to look into the dispute. 
The report, published (with extracts from ‘relevant’ documents) as the Commercium 
Epistoclicum, and written by Newton himself, concluded that he was ‘the first inventor’ 
of the calculus and found Leibniz guilty of concealing his knowledge of the prior, 
relevant achievements of others, and it was concluded that the 1670s correspondence had 
been of vital importance for his publication of the calculus. Newton’s case relied on a 
letter of 1672 (which contained his tangent rule) to Collins, which he alleged, 
erroneously, that Leibniz had seen in early 1676, rather than the 1676 letters that Keill 
used. In reality argues Hall, by the time Leibniz did see the letter it was too late for it to 
have had an impact on is work. 37 
 
Leibniz responded with a ‘anonymous’ leaflet, known as the Charta Volans, 
which included a supposedly impartial opinion on the Commercium Epistoclicum, 
actually written by his friend and supporter, Johann Bernoulli. In this leaflet, Newton was 
now openly accused of plagiarism, with a claim that Newton’s earlier work was not in 
fact the calculus, but rather was concerned with ‘advancing geometry synthetically or 
                                               
36 Hall, pp. 178-179  
37 Hall, pp. 179-181 
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directly by infinitely small quantities’. Leibniz’s claim to primacy rested in the public 
history of the calculus’s development in association with Leibniz himself.38 By now both 
sides had dug their heels in and an impasse had been reached.  
 
 
2.1.4 The Aftermath:  
 
There was some more to-ing and fro-ing between the two sides with responses 
and remarks by various authors, including Keill and Bernoulli, published in journals.39 
But Newton and Leibniz carried on attacking each other indirectly too.  
 
In February 1715 Newton wrote an anonymous review in Philosophical 
Transactions, of the Society’s report on the priority dispute where he contrasted his 
methods with those of Leibniz:  
It must be allowed that these two Gentlemen differ very much in 
Philosophy. The one proceeds upon the Evidence arising from 
Experiments and Phenomena, and stops where such Evidence is wanting; 
the other is taken up with Hypotheses, and propounds them, not to be 
examined by Experiments, but to be believed without examination. The 
one for want of Experiments to decide the Question doth not affirm 
whether the Cause of Gravity be Mechanical or not Mechanical; the 
other that it is a perpetual Miracle if it be not Mechanical.40 
 
This is obviously referring to the dispute about the cause of gravity and not the calculus, 
highlighting how the two issues have become interlinked, and is in turn a facetious dig 
responding to a criticism that Leibniz gave in a published letter of 1712 to Nicolas 
Hartsoeker.41 Nonetheless it is all too easy to see Newton’s central position in the 
                                               
38 Hall, pp. 199-200 
39 Hall, pp. 202-212 
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resolution of, and reporting on, the debate as an abuse of power, especially in light of 
current thinking on the invention of the calculus.  
 
Leibniz meanwhile was resurrecting the gravity argument in an attack on 
Newton’s philosophy, including a provocative attack on the religious consequences to 
Newtonian (and Lockean) thinking in a letter to princess Caroline of Wales in November 
1715.42 Although this does not appear to have presented any serious problems for 
Newton, it appears quite vindictive. This attack led to a correspondence between Leibniz 
and Samuel Clarke with Clarke defending Newton. Leibniz died in 1716, but the debate 
raged on after both his and Newton’s death (in 1727). Finally, and certainly by the early 
20th century it became commonplace to accept that they were both independent creators 
of the calculus. Ball, while not of this view, does however tell us in 1901 that this was 
indeed the prevalent opinion at the time.43  
 
2.2 Methodology of the Calculus: 
 
Ian Stewart explains the notion of an infinitesimal by appealing to the 
subdivision of a line. He asks if we can think of a line as being a sequence of points. If a 
line can be subdivided a definite amount, then the points would follow each other like 
beads on a string; after each point there would be a unique next point. But if we try to 
ask which real number corresponds to the point ‘next to’ the origin we get into 
difficulty. We want this number to be 0.00000……, with a 1 appearing in the very last 
place, but there is no last place. For any decimal number of the form 0.0000…01, we 
can always think of a smaller number.  
                                               
42 Janiak 
43 Ball, p. 357 
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Stewart says that there are two ways out of this dilemma. We can assert that 
there really is a next number larger than 0, but that it is infinitesimally larger than 0, 
which makes it smaller than anything of the form 0.0000…01. Or we can adopt the 
position that no such number exists, in which case we can think of the line as being 
subdivided indefinitely, and accept that there are no ‘ultimate atoms’.  
 
In the latter position the consequence is that we can’t think of a line as being 
made up of points strung together in order, but at the same time we know, by Euclid, 
that any position on a line is a point. (We just draw two lines with one crossing the 
other, and where they meet is a point.)44 Here we have a contradiction. But if we accept 
the former position we arrive at a contradiction too: if we take the variable x as the 
smallest number greater than 0, we end up in a position where x/2 must be smaller than 
x but greater than 0. Therefore, x can’t be the smallest number greater than 0 on pain of 
contradiction.45 
 
However, despite this difficulty, infinitesimals had proved useful. Long after 
Archimedes had used them to determine the volume of a sphere Nicholas of Cusa. in the 
fifteenth century, used a similar approach on the area of a circle. By slicing up a circle 
like a pie, he created a series of near triangles. If we then ignore the curves and work out 
the area of the triangles left by using the straight lines we can draw across the bottom of 
the triangles where the curves begin, to form the bases, and add the areas together the 
total will be approximate to πr2, which we know to be the area of a circle (the height of 
each triangle is the radius of the circle). If we could make the ‘triangles’ infinitesimally 
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small, then there would be no error.46 Uses like this meant that infinitesimals were a 
long way from being abandoned, and they duly ended up being utilised in the calculus 
as it was developed by both Newton and Leibniz.  
 
2.2.1 Newton’s Calculus Applied to an Example of a Parabola: 
 
Stewart demonstrates Newton’s calculus as being put to use in solving the 
problem of how to draw a tangent to a given curve. He gives the example of a parabola 
whose equation is y=x2 and shows how Newton’s calculus allows us to work out the 
slope of the tangent at x. Stewart gives the following characterisation of Newton’s 
work: 
Let x increase slightly to x + ο. Then x2 changes to (x + ο)2. The rate of 
change is therefore the ratio of the difference between the squares to the 
difference in the value of x, namely 
[((x + ο)2 – x2]/[ (x + ο) – x],  
which simplifies to yield  
 [2οx + ο2]/ο = 2x + ο. 
Let ο approach zero; then the slope approaches 2x + 0 =2x. This is the 
slope of the tangent, or, as Newton put it, the fluxion of the fluent x2.47  
 
This works on any parabola. If a parabola has the equation y = x3, the fluxion will be 
3x2.48 Newton defined a fluent as a quantity that varies over time, and a fluxion as the 
rate at which it does so, (and which we now call a derivative or a differential).49 
 
 
 
 
                                               
46 Stewart, pp.73-74 
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Newton introduces the variable ο (Leibniz used δ). 
48 Stewart, p. 75 
49 Moore, p. 64 
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3. Berkeley’s Objections to the Calculus: 
 
 Douglas M. Jesseph separates Berkeley’s objections into metaphysical and 
logical.50 In addition, a compensation of errors thesis tackles the issue of how the 
calculus arrives at truth, but not science.51 I will follow this distinction and will talk 
about each in turn. In ‘The Analyst’ the metaphysical objections occur first, so I shall 
begin with them.  
 
3.1 Metaphysical Objections:  
 
As Moore discusses, despite its brilliance the notion of an infinitesimal 
difference on which the calculus rests is flawed, an infinitesimal being not quite 
nothing, and not quite something. Leibniz and Newton both made use of the 
infinitesimally small, but were aware of the difficulties of relying on such a notion. 
Leibniz thought of it as a useful façon de parler, while Newton made suggestions for 
how to eliminate infinitesimals by considering them as limits, (foreshadowing modern-
day calculus).52 So, although the calculus worked, it raised problems, the infinitely 
small distances or infinitesimals were contradictory, and this was heavily criticised by 
Berkeley. This is an objection primarily about the nature of infinitesimals themselves 
and that an infinitely small object cannot exist and can therefore not be given an 
ontological status. A metaphysical mystery then obtains at the heart of the calculus.  
 
Additionally, Berkeley would have seen this as a methodological problem, with 
the two fields of mathematics and the principles of Christianity subject to different 
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conditions of proof. Mathematics was supposed to be rational and mystery free, unlike 
religion and the Principles of Christianity, which do, for Berkeley, have a mysterious 
nature, and can be underpinned by faith. As he states in the Philosophical 
Commentaries: ‘for tho the Principles may be founded in Faith yet this hinders not but 
that legitimate Demonstrations might be built thereon’.53 
 
Berkeley’s attack can be found in his 1734 essay, ‘The Analyst’ in which he 
asks:  
And what are these fluxions? The velocities of evanescent increments? 
And what are these same evanescent increments? They are neither finite 
quantities, nor quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not 
call them ghosts of departed quantities?54  
 
As Stewart puts it, Berkeley’s arguments are that if ο is not exactly 0, then the answer 
we get is very close, but wrong. On the other hand, if ο is 0, then we can’t divide by it, 
so the answer doesn’t make sense55 
 
Berkeley begins in §§3-8 of ‘The Analyst’ by describing the object of the 
mathematical analysis.56 At the start of section §3, he identifies the method of fluxions 
as the key to how mathematics unlocks the secrets of geometry, and how it has been 
able to make progress since the Greeks, and he identifies fluxions as the main tool of 
contemporary geometry.57 Following Newton’s ‘Introduction to the Quadrature of 
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Curves’, Berkeley gives his description of the calculus by starting with the observation 
that lines are generated by the motion of points, planes by the motion of lines and solids 
by the motion of planes. In describing lines in this way, i.e. as generated by the motion 
of points, it is likely, following Newton as he does, that he is alluding to the 
representation of the progress of a single point by a line in a standard graph with an x 
and a y axis. This is one application of the calculus. Under this application we get the 
plane by extending this line through a third z axis, and the solid by projecting the plane 
through 3-dimensional space. Taking a line to represent the motion of an object (the y 
axis being distance travelled and the x axis being time), he says that the ‘quantities’, or 
distances travelled increase or decrease depending on their velocity.58 (Quantities are 
Newton’s ‘fluents’, and are described by him as being generated by a continual 
motion).59 He goes on to tell us that we can determine these quantities from the 
velocities the line represents.60 If this line has some curvature,61 we will need the 
calculus to do this. Velocities which are subject to the calculus are called 
‘fluxions’(differentials) and the ‘quantities’ (distances travelled) are called ‘flowing 
quantities’, which is to say that they change depending on which position on the line we 
are analysing. The ‘fluxions’ are nearly the same increments as the ‘flowing quantities’, 
but they tend towards zero, and are in fact the same increments as can be generated in 
the immeasurable parts of time during which that part of the motion is taking place. 
Sometimes we will not be considering the velocities, but the instantaneous intervals of 
undetermined distance travelled; these we call moments.62  
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Fluxions are concerned with these moments. In §4, Berkeley tells us that these 
moments are not finite. Moments are only the burgeoning origins or increments of finite 
‘quantities’ or distances travelled, before they become finite particles or increase by a 
finite amount, or their disappearing conclusions after they have been finite. What we are 
concerned with, the ‘fluxions’ or differentials, are ‘celerities’ or rates of change, not 
proportional to the smallest finite particles (which we can’t quantify), but to the 
instantaneous moments, and we only consider the ‘proportion’ to these instantaneous 
increments and not their actual magnitude.63 This seems to correspond to the steps in 
Newton’s calculus where he introduces the quantity x + ο and lets ο tend towards 0 in 
order to calculate the differential. The difference between the two quantities 2x + ο and 
2x + 0, i.e. 2x in the example from the previous section, is the proportion, which is of 
course an infinitesimal amount in all but name. We can also get fluxions of fluxions (or 
further differentials) by starting with the first fluxion or differential (which is velocity) 
as the ‘fluent’ or ‘quantity’, and from there we can generate the second differential 
(which is acceleration), and then the third differential etc.64   
 
Berkeley then objects that we cannot even perceive very minute particles and 
that our imagination which derives from our sense will struggle to allow us to conceive 
of such concepts as the least particles of time, or the least increments that they generate. 
The situation worsens when we try to conceive of ‘moments’ the instantaneous 
increments we consider before they become finite. Still harder, is an ability to conceive 
of the velocities of such ‘entities’, or differentials, which he describes as ‘objects at first 
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fleeting and minute, soon vanishing out of sight’, and conception of the second, third 
etc. differentials, he argues, is beyond human understanding.65  
 
After analysing Newton’s version of the calculus, Berkeley, in §5 and §6, moves 
on to Leibniz, whom he claims is considered more intelligible. But Leibniz fares no 
better under Berkeley’s scrutiny. Where Newton gives us fluxions, Leibniz talks openly 
of infinitely small amounts, called differences and infinitesimals, which Berkeley finds 
equally perplexing.66 
 
Douglas M. Jesseph points out that underlying these metaphysical objections (on 
the grounds of inconceivability) is a familiar trait of Berkeley’s epistemology, and that 
he is making two assumptions; that ‘extremely minute’ objects cannot be clearly 
apprehended by sense and that our imagination is derived from our sensations. Jesseph 
accepts that the first claim is unproblematic, but the second claim contains an 
underlying assumption that our mental faculties consist only of sense and imagination 
with no faculty for framing independent ideas through ‘pure intellect’.67 Jesseph draws 
on §1 of ‘Principles of Human Knowledge’ for this observation.68 (I shall return to this 
point when I consider the context of Berkeley’s wider philosophy in relation to these 
objections in Chapter 4.) 
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It may be the case that our imagination does depend in some way on our 
perceptions, but Berkeley’s formulation of this idea is at odds with the standard 
mathematical epistemologies of his time.  
 
An additional issue with this objection is that it may be at odds with Berkeley’s 
views and apparent acceptance of other mathematical objects that could be considered 
ontologically suspect, such as imaginary numbers. In Alciphron, Berkeley accepts the 
role of imaginary numbers, ‘for instance the algebraic mark, which denotes the root of q 
negative square hath its use in logistic operators’.69 This objection is about the supposed 
nature of the objects, so why might imaginary numbers be different for Berkeley? It 
does not seem obvious that it wouldn’t apply to both. I shall return to the issue of 
imaginary numbers when we consider Berkeley’s philosophy beyond his objections in 
‘The Analyst’.  
 
The metaphysical objection appears vulnerable then (and we shall go on to see 
that it is the most easily defused by considerations of approaches to realism in the 
modern philosophy of mathematics). More will need to be done to stand a chance of 
convincing mathematicians of his arguments. Thus in §8 of ‘The Analyst’, Berkeley 
alludes to the impossibilities and contradictions that will form the basis of his logical 
argument against the calculus.70 
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3.2 Logical Objections: 
 
In §§9-16 of ‘The Analyst’ Berkeley, using examples from Newton’s Principia 
moves on to consider the principles of “this new analysis” using ‘momentums’, 
‘fluxions’ or infinitesimals. (The metaphysical objections previously discussed are 
captured under what Berkeley calls considering its object).71 Berkeley here introduces 
another term; ‘momentum’ which means the same as ‘fluxion’ (or what we call a 
differential today). No reason for introducing this new terminology, nor any indication 
as to why he is using the particular term ‘momentum’ is given, but it does seem 
plausible that this term is used because the quantities being considered, the fluxions, are 
derived from what Newton calls ‘moments’, so a ‘momentum’ is a ‘fluxion’, as it is 
derived from a moment. Further, Berkeley deliberately also uses the word infinitesimals 
here because he is going to argue that however Newton may choose to describe 
‘fluxions’, they are in fact infinitesimals, and so he is introducing the correlation at the 
start of the argument. It is in this discussion, of the principles, that Berkeley’s logical 
objections, which Jesseph considers much more compelling than the metaphysical ones, 
are brought to bear on the calculus.72 These objections are about the inconsistency in the 
proofs in that the quantity assigned to the ‘fluxions’ or ‘momentums’ is supposed to be 
an (infinitely small) quantity at one stage of the proof and no quantity at all at another 
stage of the proof. It is therefore taken to be both something and nothing which is 
inconsistent.  
 
Berkeley takes an example from Newton’s Principia which he takes to be the 
main point of the method of fluxions: “to obtain the fluxion or momentum of the 
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rectangle or product of two indeterminate quantities”,73 known today as the product 
rule. As Jesseph says in modern notation this rule states ‘that given functions f(x) and 
g(x) the derivative of the product f(x)g(x) is f'(x)g(x) + f(x)g'(x)’’74 
 
That is to say that the derivative of the product f(x)g(x) is (the derivative of the function 
f(x) multiplied by the function g(x)) plus (the function f(x) multiplied by the derivative 
of the function g(x)).  From this rule we derive the rules for obtaining the derivatives of 
all other products and powers.75  
 
In the Principia Newton gives a proof, which Berkeley describes as follows: 
Suppose the product of a rectangle AB is increased by continual motion and that the 
increments of the sides measure a and b respectively. We then consider the rectangle 
smaller by half the increment. At this point the sides measure (A – ½a) and (B – ½b), 
which means that (with expansion) the product or area of this smaller rectangle would 
measure AB – ½aB – ½bA + ¼ab. We then consider the original rectangle made larger 
by the other half of the increment. At this point the larger rectangle would measure AB 
+ ½aB + ½Ba + ¼ab. We then subtract the area of the smaller rectangle from the larger 
rectangle, which leaves a difference of aB + bA, which is the increment (or moment) of 
the rectangle generated by the entire increments a and b.76      
 
Berkeley then objects to this proof by pointing out that the correct method for 
calculating the increment of the rectangle AB is to take the incremented area and from it 
subtract the original area. This would give us (AB + aB + bA + ab) – AB, which leaves 
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us with aB + bA + ab. This is clearly larger, by the quantity ab. Berkeley says this has to 
be true in all cases regardless of the nature of the quantities involved. Claiming that ab 
is a quantity of infinitesimal size is, he argues, no defence for Newton’s proof.77 
 
Berkeley does, in §10, highlight the need for Newton to get rid of the quantity 
ab.78 Newton’s proof is also valid, and does demonstrate that the area derived from 
these calculations of the rectangles generated by using the two half a and b increments 
added together, as seen above, is the same as the area we get from the calculations using 
the increments a and b on the outside of the original rectangle, minus the area ab. In 
fact, if we visualise the rectangles we can quite easily see how these quantities match. 
But this comes at the cost of breaking the standard rule for finding the difference in 
areas between two shapes; i.e. that you simply subtract the smaller area from the larger 
one.  
 
When Jesseph discusses this objection by Berkeley, he tells us that Newton in 
Principia declares that the moment of a flowing quantity is its momentary increment. 
Jesseph argues that if that is the case, then the moment of the product AB must be the 
difference between AB and (A + a) ´ (B + b), i.e. as Berkeley states it is the difference 
in area between the two original rectangles. Jesseph also criticises Newton for utilising 
the quantities ½a and ½b on two counts; firstly, that of taking the increment of the 
wrong product, and secondly, for introducing a supposition that we divide increments of 
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negligible magnitude into parts, which he says is confusing. 79 In the latter case he is 
taking up a point that Berkeley makes in §11, where he criticises Newton’s method.  
 
These criticisms by Berkeley arise around Newton’s use of infinitesimals. He 
points out that however Newton may describe these momentums or fluxions, they are in 
fact infinitesimals in the following argument: 
 
1) Points or mere limits of nascent lines must be equal in magnitude as they are 
not actually quantities.  
 
2) If a momentum is more than these initial limits, then it must either be finite 
or infinitesimal.  
 
3) Newton has excluded the possibility that momentums can be understood to 
be finite. 
 
4) Therefore, momentums must be infinitesimals. 
 
Further, Berkeley argues that there just cannot be a quantity between finite and nothing 
without admitting of infinitesimals, and he states that if an increment is generated in a 
finite amount of time, it too must be finite.80 Only an infinitesimal amount of time will 
allow you to generate an infinitesimal increment. These parts can have no magnitude 
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and therefore it makes no sense to say that they can be divided into smaller parts. In 
addition, Berkeley argues that it makes no sense to utilise quantities less than a and b to 
obtain the increment of AB and that Newton has failed to give his reasons for doing so.  
 
 Jesseph agrees that Berkeley is right in all of this, and that these arguments are 
pivotal in establishing Berkeley’s claims that the calculus lacks rigour. This claim, 
Jesseph argues, is backed up by Newton’s proof itself, which in fact demonstrates this 
lack of rigour. Berkeley’s arguments in this section therefore correctly lead him to 
conclude that the procedures of the calculus are not properly demonstrated and that 
Newton’s fluxions and moments are no different from the infinitesimals that Leibniz 
uses in his calculus.81    
 
To further back up his arguments Berkeley goes on to look at another proof 
given by Newton; that of finding a fluxion of any power (what we today call the power 
rule). This rule states that the differential of a power of x is equal to the product of the 
exponent times x with the exponent reduced by 1, i.e. the differential of xn is nxn-1.  In 
§12, prior to his discussion of this proof, Berkeley’s adds an observation that you can’t 
get rid of a point without getting rid of any points that depend on it, and introduces the 
following lemma to capture this observation: 
If with a view to demonstrate any proposition, a certain point is 
supposed, by virtue of which certain other points are attained; and such 
supposed point be it self afterwards destroyed or rejected by a contrary 
supposition; in that case all the other points attained thereby, and 
consequent thereupon, must also be destroyed and rejected, so as from 
thence forward to be no more supposed or applied in the 
demonstration.82 
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As Jesseph points out this lemma is essentially saying that a proof must not 
contain contradictory premises. When moving on to the proof itself, in §§13 
and14, Berkeley draws on his lemma to present his objection, accusing Newton 
of violating this principle, in his assumptions that the quantity o in the proof is 
both greater than zero and equal to zero.83  
 
This proof utilises an infinite series, and starts with the premise that the quantity 
x flows uniformly, i.e. we are assuming a constant rate of change. The aim then is to 
find the ‘fluxion’ of xn, (the ‘fluxion’ of any power of x). Next, we take the quantity x + 
o, which is what x becomes after some time. At this stage the power xn becomes (x + o)n, 
because it follows that as x increases every power of x will increase by the same 
proportion. So according to the method of infinite series: 
xn + nοxn -1 + nn – n ooxn-2  etc.  
    2 
 
And if we subtract the root and the power respectively, from the two incremented 
quantities: 
 
o and nοxn -1 + nn – n ooxn-2  etc.  
      2 
 
And if we divide the increments by the common divisor o, these quotients are yielded: 
 
1 and nxn -1 + nn – n oxn-2  etc.  
    2 
 
These are therefore the exponents of the ratio of the increments.  
 
 
Up until now, Berkeley says, we have supposed that the variable x flows, that x 
has a real increment, that o has a quantity. This supposition has been necessary for us to 
make all the steps in the proof thus far. It is this assumption that allows us to compare 
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the increment of xn with the increment of x, and find the proportion between the two 
increments. At this stage in the proof Newton now supposes that there are no increments 
of x or that o has no quantity, then the last ratio is 1 to nxn-1.84 Newton uses this to 
conclude that the fluxion of the quantity x is to the fluxion of the quantity xn as 1 is to 
nxn-1, 85 in other words, this give us the power rule. 
 
The main thrust of Berkeley’s objection is that Newton’s last supposition that 
there are no increments violates the lemma he introduced in §12. This supposition is, 
argues Berkeley, contrary to the first supposition that Newton made, namely that there 
are such increments. By keeping the value nxn-1, which Newton only got on the basis of 
a supposition he later drops, he has violated the principle of the lemma introduced by 
Berkeley. Specifically, Newton has assumed that o is greater than zero at the start of the 
proof, but later after dividing out the common term o he has assumed that o equals 
zero.86  
 
Berkeley follows this argument by reiterating the similarity between Newton’s 
fluxions and the differential calculus of Leibniz which openly utilises infinitesimals. 
Newton claims specifically in the Introduction to the Quadrature of Curves that his 
method means that he does not have to utilise infinitesimals (which makes it agreeable 
to classical geometry), but for Berkeley, this is not borne out in Newton’s proofs, and 
there is no discernible difference between the two methods in this sense.87  
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Finally, Berkeley makes the point that he is not disputing the truth of Newton’s 
claims, just the methods he uses to arrive at them. The truth of the conclusion cannot be 
used in logic to justify the soundness of an argument. As we learn in logic it is perfectly 
possible to have a true conclusion in spite of an argument where either a premise is 
false, or an inference is invalid. For example, the argument:   
 
All cats are black 
Lucky is a cat 
Therefore, Lucky is black 
 
where Lucky happens to be a black cat, is a valid argument that happens to have a true 
conclusion in spite of having a false premise. Berkeley asserts that in all other sciences 
the conclusions must follow from their principles, but the Newtonian approach is 
working the other way around by starting with the conclusion, and is thus unscientific.88  
 
 While Stewart and Moore, for example, accept that Berkeley’s arguments were 
justified, some have tried to defend Newton against Berkeley. One such approach which 
argues that the tools of Newton’s calculus are precursors to the limiting process and can 
therefore be understood in such terms. However, Jesseph tells us that this misses the 
point. Calculus has indeed developed and infinitesimals and fluxions have been 
replaced by first limits and then, in turn, real analysis has been introduced. But, Jesseph 
argues, we need to consider Berkeley’s criticisms in the context of the mathematics of 
the day.89 A charitable interpretation that is reliant on modern mathematical resources 
                                               
88 ‘The Analyst’, §§19-20, pp. 76-77 
89 It can also be argued that limits, while an improvement on the work of Newton and Leibniz, are still not 
clear, and lead to similar issues.  
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does not change the facts about the rigour, or lack thereof, of C17 and C18 calculus.90 
Moore even points out that Newton and Leibniz and their contemporaries were not 
unaware of the problems raised by the calculus at the time.91 This is an important debate 
which will be explored when I consider the broader question of mathematical realism. 
 
3.3 Objections: Truth and Reality - The Compensation of Errors Thesis: 
 
 Berkeley has argued that the methodology of the calculus can get at truth but not 
science, so his next task is to explain this observation. This explanation is termed ‘the 
Compensation of Errors Thesis’ by Jesseph, who explains:  
He (Berkeley) claims that the calculus yields inexact results 
when its algorithms are applied to analytic expressions for 
curves, but that this analytic error is balanced by a compensating 
geometric error when the resulting equation is used in the 
solution of the problem.92 
 
Berkeley then presents four problems to illustrate this point. Jesseph tells us that the 
problem which best highlights this point is the first one Berkeley gives. I will therefore 
only concentrate on this one, which can be found in §21-23 of ‘The Analyst’. This is 
essentially an objection that while the method is clever in that it gets at truth, it does so 
at the cost of the required rigour that mathematics (as a science) ought to be adhering. 
The important point here to note is that Berkeley is taking issue with mathematicians 
using the tools of science to make judgements about the principles of Christianity, when 
in fact they don’t adhere to the same rigour in parts of their own field. Further, Berkeley 
believes that religion should be mysterious, where science should not, so it is wrong to 
try to put the two fields on the same playing field.  
                                               
90 Jesseph, p. 198 
91 Moore, p. 65 
92 Jesseph, p. 200  
 40 
 
For this critique, Berkeley takes one of Leibniz’s proofs, that which solves the 
problem of finding a subtangent drawn to a parabola, and examines it as performed by 
infinitesimal differences. The proof is for finding the subtangent for the point B on the 
curve, which is the line PT, as illustrated in this diagram taken from ‘The Analyst’:93 
 
 
 
Jesseph gives us the following distances which are also utilised in the proof: x, which is 
the distance AP, dx, which is the distance PM, y, which is the distance MR, dy, which is 
the distance RN and z, which is the distance NL. (As Jesseph points out, Berkeley says 
he is discussing a tangent, but the example swiftly moves on to discuss the subtangent 
instead).94 
 
Firstly, we take a point M. For simplicity in describing the points needed for the 
proof I am assuming this point to be the origin in a system of Cartesian coordinates 
which has a value of (0, 0). Further, take the point M to be at the right angle of a right-
                                               
93 ‘The Analyst’ §21, p. 77 
94 Jesseph, pp. 200-201 
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angled triangle, MLT where L is a positive point on the x-axis, i.e. (x, 0) and T is a 
positive point on the y-axis, i.e. (0, y). TL will also form part of the tangent at a point B 
on the curve which we will be considering. The proof then takes a parabola (a mirror 
symmetrical curve), AB,95 where A is a point (0, y), and where the y value at A is less 
than the y value at T, and B is a point (x, y), and where the y value at B is lower than 
the y value at A. From this curve we then consider several functions:96 
 
The abscissa (formerly abscisse); this is the line AP which is the line that can be 
drawn along the y-axis from point A to another point, P, which has the same value on 
the y-axis as point B of the curve. (This tracks the height of the curve.) This function 
has the value x.  
 
The ordinate; this is the line PB. (This tracks the length of the curve). This function has 
the value y.   
 
The difference of the abscissa; this is the line PM. This function has the value dx.  
 
The difference of the ordinate; this is the line RN. (The differences are infinitely small 
differences that are designed to capture the rate of change along these lines as they 
relate to the rate of change of the curve.) This is a line that can be drawn along the x-
axis, where the point R has the same x value as point B, and the point N forms a point 
                                               
95 The curve can be extended beyond point B (by an infinitely small distance) to a point N which lies 
between points R and L on the x axis. This point N will also be utilised in the proof. 
96 A function here meaning line segments or lengths that can be determined from each point of a curve 
relating it to a given line or axis. David Dennis and Jere Confrey, ‘Functions of a Curve: Leibniz’s 
Original Notion of Functions and its Meaning for the Parabola’, The College Mathematics Journal, Vol 
26, No. 3, 1995, pp. 124-131, p.124 
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where an extension of the curve AB, namely BN, intersects with the x-axis, and thus has 
an x value less than RL. This function has the value dy. 97  
 
Thus AP = x, PB = y, PM = dx, RN = dy 
 
The curve AB is expressed mathematically as y2 = px, where p is a constant and 
x and y are variables. Next, we suppose the curve to be a polygon (with infinitely many 
sides), this allows us to think of BN, the difference or increment of the curve, as a 
straight line which coincides with the tangent. We also get a differential triangle BRN 
which we treat as similar to the triangle TPB. The subtangent for the point B on the 
curve is the line PT. The similarity of the triangles BRN and TPB allows us to establish 
that the ratio between RN and RB is the same as that between PB and PT. This means 
that the value of PT = ydx/dy. However, fully solving the problem means we need to be 
able to express PT in a way which will allow us to eliminate dx and dy from the 
equation. We can do this by taking 2ydy = pdx which is the derivative of y2 = px (the 
mathematical expression of the curve AB). dy can therefore be expressed by pdx/2y. PT 
than can be given in the following way that solves the problem:98 
(1) PT   =   ydx     =  2y2 
  pdx/2y       p 
 
 Having given this proof Berkeley then argues that it works by containing two 
errors which compensate each other. Firstly, the triangle RNB is not similar to PBT, 
RLB is. If we therefore give the line NL the value z, then the subtangent is actually 
expressed as: 
                                               
97 ‘The Analyst’, §21, p. 77 
98 Jesseph, pp. 200-201 
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(2) PT  =      ydx   
  dy + z 
This means the value of the subtangent at the end of this step was too large (by the 
quantity of z).99 
 
 Secondly, there is an error in the differentiation of  y2  = px. This was given as 
2ydy = pdx, which can also be rearranged and simplified as: dy = pdx/2y. But if we take 
the increments dx and dy of x and y, we should get (y + dy)2  =  p(x + dx) or: 
 
(3) y2 + 2ydy +dy2 =  px + pdx  
 
This means that the increment of the equation is 2ydy +dy2 =  pdx.  And when we 
rearrange and simplify this we get: 
dy =   pdx   –  dy2  
 2y 2y 
   
This also makes the value of dy appear to be too large, differing as it does by the term 
dy2/2y. But if this term can be shown to equal z, then the two errors will cancel each 
other out leaving us with the same result as before.100 Berkeley goes on to demonstrate 
that this is indeed the case.  
 
 In section §22 of ‘The Analyst’ Berkeley draws on the Conics of Appolonius to 
prove that z = dy2/2y.101 This states that the subtangent to a parabola is bisected at the 
vertex, implying that TP = 2AP or 2x.102 Berkeley denotes BR (dx) by m and RN (dy) by 
                                               
99 ‘The Analyst’, §21, p. 77, Jesseph, pp. 201-202 
100 Jesseph, p.202 
101 ‘The Analyst’, §22, p. 78 
102 Jesseph, pp. 202-203 
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n, and uses the Apollonian theorem and the similarity of the triangles TPB and BRL to 
derive the following:   
 
2x  =      m      
y (n + z) 
which can be expressed as:  
 
(4) (n + z)     =   my 
      2x  
 
 
We then go back to y2 + 2ydy +dy2 =  px + pdx (the expanded expression for the 
parabola), replacing dx by m and dy by n to get: 
y2 + 2yn +n2 =  px + mp  
Removing y2 and px which have the same value we get:  
2yn + n2 = mp  
We then divide by p to get: 
m   =  2yn + n2 
     p  
From (y2 = px) we get x = y2/p. We then substitute these values for m and x respectively 
into the equation (4) and get:  
(n + z) =  my   =  2y2np + yn2p 
    2x         2y2p 
 
We then cancel out the common term py, which leaves us with:  
 
(n + z)    =  2yn + n2 
         2y 
 
And finally, when we reduce that to an expression for z, we get:103 
 
z   = n2    =   dy2 
 2y 2y   
                                               
103 Ibid 
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In section §23 of ‘The Analyst’ Berkeley lists four observations that he has drawn 
from his proof:  
(i) The conclusion of Leibniz’s proof comes out right not because the rejected 
square of dy was infinitely small, but because it is compensated by a 
contrary error that is of an equal value. 
(ii) No matter how small a rejected value is, a proportional error will be present 
in the conclusion.  
(iii) When a conclusion is in fact accurate but drawn from inaccurate premises, 
we can’t say that the conclusion is accurate in virtue of the premises, but 
only in virtue of some other principles, of which even the person putting 
forth the argument may have been unaware. 
(iv) This applies no matter the size of the quantities with which we are dealing. 
The rejected quantities are legitimately rejected not for their smallness (as 
infinitesimals), but because the compensating errors are the only things 
keeping them in the proof.104  
 
Jesseph analyses Berkeley’s proof and observations. The first point he makes is that 
Berkeley has demonstrated a way to find the subtangent without recourse to 
infinitesimals. He appears to interpret dx and dy as finite differences and this 
interpretation enables the Apollonian theorem to give the value of the subtangent 
correctly. This in turn hints at the possibility of developing the calculus without 
recourse to infinitesimals. Berkeley believed that this enterprise was possible, although 
he never attempted it. Further he believed in the importance of such a project, given that 
                                               
104 ‘The Analyst’, §23, pp. 78-79 
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he took the theorems to yield true results, despite the flawed nature of the methods 
employed.105  
 
Such a view has something in common with certain types of nominalistic 
approaches to mathematical fictionalism, whereby philosophers of mathematics have 
attempted to recast some of mathematics without recourse to numbers. However, an 
approach that recast the calculus without recourse to infinitesimals would not appear to 
guarantee fictionalism of mathematics more generally, unless the project was extended 
to further nominalise the calculus. Rather it would be analogous, in that it might grant a 
fictionalist account of the calculus while still calling for a type of realism about 
mathematical objects more generally. (This comparison will briefly be discussed when 
we look at fictionalism in chapter 5 of this thesis.)  
 
However, despite Berkeley’s belief that the calculus could be developed along these 
lines his work only goes to show that some problems in the theory of conic sections 
could be solved by employing classical methods.106 Further, if classical methods were 
sufficient or the simplest method of solving the problems of the calculus, there would 
surely have been no motivation to develop such a system in the first place.  
 
The calculus wasn’t developed along the lines that Berkeley utilised in his work on 
the compensation of errors theory. Instead the theory of infinitesimals developed and 
the notion of limits was employed. Jesseph explains that in the modern theory of 
infinitesimals we would treat z as an infinitesimal which obeys the law p + z = p for any 
real number p. Under a theory of limits both steps take the limit of a quantity k + z as z 
                                               
105 Jesseph, p. 204 
106 Jesseph, pp. 227-228 
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approaches zero. The other main point Jesseph makes in his discussion of the 
compensation or errors thesis in this example concerns an analysis of the assumption of 
the compensating errors themselves. He argues that employing these modern theories of 
the calculus allows us to deny that there are any such errors.107 In the first case the real 
numbers are dense so there can be no real number between p and the next real number 
in the sequence, so z cannot specify a quantity. In the second case z approaches zero, but 
it never gets there, so it won’t have the contradictory status of being both a quantity and 
zero. However, this is to take an anachronistic approach and does not really address the 
problem within the nascent calculus with which Berkeley is concerned.108  
 
Berkeley’s compensation of errors thesis specifically deals with the question of how 
we arrive at true results within a system which he sees as non-scientific. This issue is of 
central importance to the options I shall be exploring later in this thesis that specifically 
address the realism in philosophy of mathematics debate, and how we may best 
understand the role of mathematical entities. 
 
3.4 Questions Arising from Berkeley’s Objections to the Calculus: 
 
Berkeley’s main objections then follow three patterns: metaphysical objections 
based on the nature of infinitesimals and fluxions, logical objections based on the 
contradictory nature of the proofs and compensating errors that give us a version of 
‘truth’ without a solid scientific foundation. The metaphysical objections appear to be 
based on in implicit understanding of realism, but as we shall see that is not the only 
option on the table. However, it does seem obvious that Berkeley wins the logical 
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argument. Newton’s proofs are contradictory, in allowing, as Berkeley argues, a 
quantity to be assumed to be both something and nothing. Newton’s proof of the 
product rule gives a method for calculating the difference in the area of two rectangles 
that yields a different answer to the established method. And the compensation of errors 
thesis highlights that at least some of the proofs of the calculus rely on the inclusion of 
false premises.  
 
But despite all this the calculus worked; it enabled the calculation of forces, 
velocities, rates of acceleration, areas, volumes etc. in accordance with the observed 
data.109 Further, these proofs have been instrumental in developing modern 
mathematics. And from the observation that we do get truth from these proofs, we can 
ask metaphysical questions, such as if Berkeley’s philosophical arguments are valid 
how can we explain that the calculus enables us to derive useful results? What is the 
nature of such seeming non-entities as fluxions and infinitesimals? And how do they 
play a role in our understanding of mathematical truths?  In addition, this raises issues 
for the debate on realism in the philosophy of mathematics. If we do or can rely on non-
entities for our mathematical proofs, does this mean that platonism cannot be the true 
metaphysical picture? Or, do modern mathematical solutions where we can generate 
proofs that may not depend on non-entities render the question moot?110 Can we have a 
position whereby we believe that any mathematical truth can in principle be justified 
without recourse to non-entities, even if such alternatives are to be developed with the 
tools of future mathematics?  
 
                                               
109 Moore, p. 65 
110 This is working from a position where we assume that platonism has not been ruled out, so we can 
accept that numbers and other mathematical objects are at least potentially real. 
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If all this, however, leads us to conclude that platonism is in fact the wrong 
picture of mathematical objects, does the dependence upon non-entities in these proofs 
mean that all forms of mathematical realism are off the table, or is this methodology 
consistent with non-platonic forms of mathematical realism such as truth-value realism? 
Or, must we look to an alternative picture, such as fictionalism? In what follows, I aim 
to answer these questions.  
 
 
3.5 The Aftermath of Berkeley’s Objections: 
 
 In this section I look at responses form one of Berkeley’s contemporaries and 
briefly discuss the evolution of the calculus. 
 
3.5.1 Responses from Berkeley’s Contemporaries:  
 
 Only two of Berkeley’s contemporaries who responded to his objections actually 
received replies from Berkeley; Jurin and Walton. In fact, Berkeley’s last work on the 
calculus was his second of two replies to Walton.111 But Jesseph argues that both Jurin’s 
and Walton’s responses do more to strengthen Berkeley’s objections than dispel 
them.112 Walton relies heavily on Newton’s work itself, and while he does address some 
of the proofs the Berkeley criticises, he does so by not really engaging with Berkeley’s 
arguments themselves.113 Jurin’s responses take more notice specifically of Berkeley’s 
objections, so I will focus on those here.114 
                                               
111 Luce and Jessop, pp. 105-106, 145  
112 Ibid 
113 Jesseph, pp. 250-254 
114 Interestingly, Berkeley believes that his response to Jurin will also in the main deal with Walton’s 
objections too, so in his first reply to Walton, Walton’s criticism is only given an appendix appended to 
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Jurin wrote his response, a pamphlet entitled ‘Geometry no Friend to Infidelity’ 
in 1734. Jurin, in particular, took issue with what he saw as the hypocrisy of Berkeley, 
who was objecting to practices in mathematics, after he had criticised mathematicians 
for getting involved with theology.115 This criticism, and what Berkeley thought of it, 
can also be seen in the title of Berkeley’s response, ‘A Defence of Free-Thinking in 
Mathematics’, which is a reference to what Berkeley saw as a right to participate in the 
mathematical debate. Jurin firstly alleged that Berkeley was accusing the mathematical 
community of infidelity with regards to the Christian religion, and trying to make other 
infidelity. As we have seen there is some truth to this claim, (although Berkeley does 
not specifically say that there is a deliberate intent from mathematicians to turn their 
followers away from Christianity.) He also argues that Berkeley accuses 
mathematicians of using error and false reasoning in their own science. Again, this 
claim has some justification.  
 
Turning to the criticism of mathematicians using error and false reasoning there 
are principally two specific charges that relate to Berkeley’s objections directly, rather 
than just praising Newton at Berkeley’s expense. The first of these is that Berkeley 
argues that the doctrine is obscure. Jurin accuses Berkeley of overcomplicating the 
notion of fluxions, especially with regard to derivatives. He argues that ‘velocities of 
velocities’ is not a Newtonian expression, and instead that Berkeley is putting an 
unacceptable gloss on Newton’s true position. This Jesseph agrees, on the face of it, 
may have some justification, as Newton does not use the phrase. But at the same time, 
                                                                                                                                         
the response to Jurin. Walton later responds to this appendix, which does elicit another reply of sorts from 
Berkeley, entitled ‘Reasons for not Replying to Mr. Walton’s Full Answer’ (which is a pun on Walton’s 
second criticisms of Berkeley). This reply, which addresses Walton in the third person, however, takes the 
form of a letter addressed to P.T.P. 
115 Luce and Jessop, p. 105 
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he argues that Berkeley’s characterisation is not in fact an unreasonable one, as it does 
capture the essence of what is going on in the calculus. 116  
 
The second charge is that Berkeley accuses Newton of using false reasoning. 
This relates to Berkeley’s logical objections to the calculus and the compensation of 
errors thesis. Firstly, Jurin tries to prove that Newton’s product rule is rigorous. To do 
this he claims that the difference ab, by which Berkeley’s calculation of the increment 
of AB differs from Newton’s moment of the rectangle AB, is inconsiderable and makes 
no difference in practice. He argues that the quantity ab is properly rejected and 
concludes that what Newton tries to obtain by his suppositions is simply the increment 
of the rectangle (A – ½a) ´ (B – ½b), arrived at by a direct and true method. But all that 
Jurin actually does to get this result is restate Newton’s proof, except Jurin uses (A + a) 
etc. and divides by two at the end, whereas Newton uses (A + ½ a) etc., so the division 
does not need to be made later. Jesseph argues that all this does is make Berkeley’s 
point for him.117 And Berkeley’s response is to point out the weakness of the 
argument,118 and reiterate his claim that we can’t judge the calculus by the application 
of the results in practice. This further demonstrates Berkeley’s concern with the rigour, 
of the calculus, rather than the fact that it worked in practice.119 
 
Jurin next goes on to attack the arguments against the power rule, in which 
Berkeley argues that a fluxion first has an increment and then lets that increment vanish, 
which means that the proof contains two inconsistent premises. This attack is based 
upon Jurin’s translation of Newton, in which he takes the fluxions to be on the point of 
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117 Jesseph, pp. 235-237 
118 ‘A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics’ §§26-30, pp. 120-123 
119 Jesseph, pp. 243-244 
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evanescence rather than being either evanescent or not. But this misses the point; in this 
proof the point is not the ontological status of the fluxions themselves, but the issue that 
the proof is illegitimate, in that it takes fluxions to retain a quantity even after a step in 
the proof where we have already taken the quantity to have vanished.120 And Berkeley 
responds accordingly to address this point.121 
 
Jurin also makes an attempt to refute the compensation of errors thesis, which as 
Jesseph points out, is the easiest way to attack Berkeley’s arguments, but even this 
attack is not successful. Jurin’s method is to calculate the value for the subtangent 
twice, each time retaining one of the errors which Berkeley identified. The first 
calculation ‘corrects’ the error of substituting RN for RL, by using RL, but retains the 
second error of assuming that dy = pdx/2y. In the second calculation, he keeps the 
discarded infinitesimal dy2 in the differentiation of the equation y2 = px removing the 
second error, but he reintroduces the first error of using RN for RL. He then concludes 
that all three results, his two new results and the result of the original proof by Leibniz 
are valid and amount to the same answer. Jesseph points out there are two ways of 
taking this claim, either we take it that they are literally equal, in which case dy = 0, and 
the calculus is inconsistent, or we take the exactness of the results to mean that the 
differences are insignificant, and we allow small errors and in so doing remove rigour 
from mathematics.122 Clearly this is no good as a response to Berkeley’s objections and, 
tellingly, Berkeley doesn’t even address it in his reply. 
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 So, we have seen that initially at least, Berkeley’s objections were not overcome. 
Later we will see if modern metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics can fare any 
better.  
 
3.5.2 The Developments of the Calculus:  
 
Infinitesimals plagued seventeenth and eighteenth century analysis, but despite 
the philosophical arguments against them, in particular Berkeley’s, they were still 
utilised throughout this period.123 That is not to diminish the potency of Berkeley’s 
criticisms, but opinion is divided on how effective Berkeley actually was. Hilary 
Putnam goes as far as to cite Berkeley’s attack on actual infinitesimals as an example of 
philosophy making a discovery that requires changes in science,124 and Luce and Jessop 
share this line of thinking,125 while Stewart remains less convinced that any shifts were 
due to Berkeley. So, while it may be fair to say that Berkeley had indeed pointed out 
something that would require a change in science, the objections raised by Berkeley 
may not have been the motivation for the change, or at least not the only motivation.126  
 
The notion of infinitesimals in the calculus was formally replaced by limits in 
the nineteenth century.127 This was refined by Cauchy and Weierstrass. An infinitesimal 
was a limit as it tends towards 0 or infinity. An infinite sequence of rational numbers 
can have a limit that is not rational, such as √2. The calculus was carried out purely in 
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analytic terms.128 Limits were an improvement on infinitesimals, but they remained 
imprecise, and arguably only slightly more intelligible. It wasn’t until the subsequent 
development of real analysis that the problem of relying on entities that didn’t appear to 
exist was finally solved in mainstream mathematics. However, in the work of 
mathematicians such as Abraham Robinson and H. Jerome Keisler, who utilises 
Robinson’s ideas, infinitesimals have made a comeback. Keisler even uses them in 
teaching the calculus, although these are different in character from the ones used by 
Leibniz and from Newton’s fluxions.  
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4. Contextualisation of Berkeley: The Objections in Relation to Berkeley’s Overall 
Philosophy: 
 
While Berkeley’s objections to the calculus are largely well considered on their 
own terms as metaphysical and logical objections, his reasons for putting the argument 
forward stem from his broader philosophical outlook, his philosophy of religion, and the 
theological consequences that he believed could be drawn from the principles of the 
calculus.  
 
Berkeley was specifically motivated in his arguments by contemporary 
mathematicians’ objections to principles of Christianity on the grounds of incoherence. 
Berkeley’s arguments are designed to show that the principles of the calculus are no less 
mysterious or hard to comprehend.129 Therefore there is no greater reason to accept 
infinitesimals and fluxions than there is to accept the principles of Christianity which 
were no more incomprehensible.130 Luce and Jessop, editors of The Works of George 
Berkeley, point out that his immaterialism is another motivating factor.131 As a 
consequence of his immaterialism Berkeley, believed that only what we could perceive 
existed. Therefore, infinitesimlals, which we are unable to perceive could not really 
exist. There are also considerations to be taken from Berkeley’s anti-abstractionism and 
his  acceptance of the practical uses of some abstract entities in mathematics, such (as 
we have seen) as imaginary numbers.  
 
In this section I shall look at these four factors in turn. 
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4.1 Incoherence of the Principles of Christianity 
 
 In the first two sections of ‘The Analyst’ Berkeley directly addresses ‘the infidel 
mathematician’. Here Berkeley lays the charge that mathematicians by dint of being 
regarded as masters of reason attract followers not only in mathematics but in other 
fields and matters on which they may offer an opinion. Berkeley believes that these 
mathematicians have no business presenting themselves as authorities in subjects 
outside their field, and that this practice should stop, as it leads to the creation of further 
‘infidels’. He is especially concerned that the perception that those who use more reason 
and judgement are also less religious, and seemingly fearful that this will encourage the 
admirers of such men to follow suit.132 Berkeley believes that those pre-eminent in their 
fields have a responsibility to those who follow their teachings, something we also see 
at the beginning of ‘Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous where the two 
protagonists worry that the wrong views will be spread by those that heed the 
philosophers of the day to the detriment of mankind.133 
 
 To counteract the trend of mathematicians to make forays over to the field of 
religion, Berkeley allows himself ‘the same freedom’ that these men of reason have 
given themselves in exploring what he sees as his field of religion, by exploring for 
himself their field of mathematics. He sets himself the task of showing that they have no 
right to lead and expect followers in fields that are beyond their area of expertise.134 In 
the course of ‘The Analyst’ then, he argues that certain postulates and axioms of 
mathematics are not so underpinned by logic and reasoning as is supposed. Showing 
this would have the effect of demonstrating that the reason and logic employed by the 
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mathematicians is not necessarily of a greater calibre than that of those in the field of 
religion, and consequently that there is no more reason to accept certain aspects of 
mathematics than there is to accept Christianity. In fact, the principles of Christianity 
are matters of faith, and should hold some mystery, unlike mathematics which should 
not as a field of science.    
 
 This would serve to allow, and perhaps compel, people to turn to 
mathematicians for accepting the axioms and principles of the field of mathematics, and 
to men of the Church for accepting the principles of Christianity. But this is not simply 
to say that the same degree or lack thereof of rationality can be applied to both 
disciplines. Crucially mathematics and religion are very different in their natures. 
Berkeley argues that there is a demand that Christianity should have some mystery, and 
he regards such mystery as beyond human reason, but not contrary to it. But science 
including mathematics, on the other hand, must be rigorous, and objects of true science 
must be properly conceived, and science must be limited to things which are evident to 
reason.135  
 
In the queries at the end of ‘The Analyst’ Berkeley suggests that we may want to 
go further than that in redeveloping the calculus in terms of finitary mathematics, to 
presumably eliminate any mystery from it.136 But, as we shall see he only does this 
himself in a very limited capacity, and it is not entirely clear that this could be done for 
the whole of the calculus, or at least not demonstrated.  
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 Additionally, historical curiosities arise from this debate such as who the infidel 
in question is, and the precise attitude towards Christianity that he holds. The 
information about this is sketchy but it is explored by Luce and Jessop, as well as 
Jesseph. It appears that Berkeley does have a particular person in mind. However, 
despite how it may appear on a reading of ‘The Analyst’ that individual is not Isaac 
Newton himself. This is seen in Berkeley’s appendix to his ‘A Defence of Free-thinking 
in Mathematics’ in which he addresses a pamphlet written by Walton in response to 
‘The Analyst’, in which Berkeley rejects the charge that Newton is the intended 
target.137 What we can glean about the identity of the ‘infidel’ from Berkeley’s own 
words is that it is a noted mathematician still living (in 1735), whose ‘infidelity’ has 
been brought to the attention of Berkeley by Addison. Berkeley’s early biographer 
Stock identifies Edmund Halley as the ‘infidel’ apparently based on communication that 
Addison had with Berkeley. Addison is alleged to have told Berkeley of a story of a Dr. 
Garth who when close to death claimed that he did not believe it necessary to prepare 
for it ‘since my friend Dr. Halley who has dealt so much in demonstration has assured 
me that the doctrines of Christianity are incomprehensible and the religion itself an 
imposture’138 This fits the description of Berkeley’s target of a mathematician whose 
reputation for reasoning has enabled him to influence others with his views about 
religion. However, this information about Halley would have had to have been 
conveyed by letter as Addison and Berkeley were in different countries during the 
relevant time-frame. Luce and Jessop appear to accept this, believing in Stock’s 
testimony and considering it not unreasonable that such a letter had been sent.139 
                                               
137 Berkeley, ‘A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics’, 1735, Reprinted in The Works of George 
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Century Responses, ed. by David Berman, (New York: Garland, 1989), Vol. 1, pp. 5-85, pp.29-30  
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Jesseph, however, writing considerably more recently regards Stock as an unreliable 
source, and finds the lack of any evidence of such a letter troubling.140 So while Halley 
would fit the bill, the true identity of the ‘infidel’ along with the extent to which he fails 
to accept the doctrines of Christianity remain in some doubt. But clearly Berkeley was 
agitated by the influence such masters of reason had on others with regard to topics 
beyond mathematics, notably religious belief. 
 
Additionally, Berkeley’s proposed enterprise to rewrite the calculus in terms of 
finitary mathematics can be interpreted in part as a reaction to issues of reconciling God 
and infinity with the use of the infinite in mathematics, or the notion of the infinite more 
generally. For the prevailing Christian faith at that time, only God could be thought of 
as truly infinite. Further, Berkeley would argue that given the way in which we 
understand ideas as being planted in our minds by the divine mind, (which will be 
explained more fully in the next section) any ideas must be possible to be experienced 
by the finite human mind. This would make the notion of infinitesimals impossible. But 
what the belief that only God could be truly infinite meant for the notion of infinity 
considered beyond this was interpreted by different philosophers in different ways. The 
rationalists found ways to accommodate both notions, but for the empiricists (with their 
experience-dependent philosophy), such as Locke, Hume and Berkeley, the infinite, 
which could not be directly experienced, was inevitably going to be a problem. While 
he does tackle the infinitely small by commenting on infinitesimals, Berkeley, along 
with Hume, never properly discussed the infinitely big at all, which gives an indication 
of their level of discomfort with the idea.141  
 
                                               
140 Jesseph, pp. 179-180 
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4.2 Immaterialism 
 
Berkeley’s immaterialism is a form of idealism. Specifically this is metaphysical 
or ontological idealism, which is described in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
as the concept that ‘something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate 
foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality’.142 This is contrasted with formal 
or epistemological idealism where the mind independent world is taken to exist, but that 
all we know about this world is taken to be given to us by mental activities (entailing 
that all knowledge is a form of self-knowledge). And while epistemological idealism 
does not entail ontological idealism, ontological idealism does entail epistemological 
idealism. For Berkeley, then, only ideas and the minds that have them exist. His 
position of immaterialism starts with epistemological idealism, with the addition of the 
more radical ontological idealism in a move to avert scepticism. In this move he is 
challenging the ontological agnosticism which accompanies Locke’s epistemological 
idealism.143 
 
In his ‘A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge’ Berkeley 
puts forward his arguments for his immaterialism. Guyer and Horstmann identify three 
key steps in this argument.144 Firstly, Berkeley argues in accordance with Locke that 
ideas exist only in the mind. This is developed from some underlying principles that 
Berkeley takes for granted.145 All ideas or objects of knowledge are perceived by 
something which knows them, and is willing, imagining or remembering them. And this 
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thing is a mind which is distinct from the things that it is perceiving. He then argues that 
the sensations of the ideas and the objects that they compose cannot exist without a 
mind perceiving them. He therefore famously concludes that to be is to be perceived.146 
Guyer and Horstmann posit that at this stage in the argument, in light of his conclusion, 
Berkeley is already in a position to cast doubt on the notion that unperceived things 
could exist. In the first place the only things that can exist are mind-dependent. So, if 
the only things that exist for a mind are ideas, due to the fact that nothing else besides 
ideas can exist for the mind, and nothing can exist that is mind-independent, then the 
very notion that there could be something in existence which is not for the mind, or is 
not perceived, is contradictory.147 
 
Secondly, Berkeley makes a claim that an idea cannot be like anything other 
than another idea. In this assertion, Berkeley is attacking the notion that ideas resemble 
things that can exist without a mind. The reasoning behind this is assumed to be as 
follows. Two things that stand in a likeness relation must have common traits. But if 
ideas are mind-dependent and are all that there can be for the mind, then they have to be 
totally different from anything that is not mind-dependent. Therefore, there can be no 
likeness relation between two such things.148 Berkeley then challenges anyone who 
disputes this to look into their thoughts and to compare likenesses. He maintains that it 
is only possible to consider ideas, because if the external objects that these ideas 
represent are perceivable, then they have to be ideas too, for that is all that the mind can 
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perceive. Therefore, all we have been able to do is compare idea with idea, which 
proves Berkeley’s point.149  
 
Thirdly, Berkeley claims that ideas are passive and causally inert. Again, 
Berkeley calls on the introspection of the reader. He argues that when we consider our 
ideas we will not be able to consider them to hold any power or activity. This means 
that they must be passive and inert, because an idea cannot do anything or cause 
anything to happen.150 Guyer and Horstmann argue that while this section has a primary 
function of arguing against Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, it also designed to support the notion that agnosticism about the existence of 
mind-independent objects is an untenable position for someone who holds a Lockean 
epistemological position.151 This appears to be because secondary qualities are not 
generally considered to be mind-independent, they are not thought of being intrinsic to 
the object and are only relevant when we are perceiving an object. Thus, if primary 
qualities are reduced to secondary qualities, then the same must go for them.  
 
Guyer and Horstmann go on to say that this criticism of Locke is borne out of 
Berkeley’s belief in the unavoidable metaphysical conclusions that come from such 
epistemological idealism, an epistemological positon that he shares. They present a brief 
sketch of the argument ‘If existence is restricted to ideas (and minds) and if, what is 
undoubtedly the case, things or substances exist, then things or substances must be ideas 
(or minds) too.’152  
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The final step to fully establish the nature of this immaterialism is to consider 
the nature of the mind in which these ideas exist. This is done by first considering the 
fact that our ideas change and something must be causing that to happen. As Berkeley 
has argued in the previous section this cannot be the ideas themselves, so it must be a 
substance of some sort. He has already previously argued that there is no material 
substance, so Berkeley concludes that this substance must be incorporeal and therefore a 
spirit. This must be one undivided being, a divine mind. Berkeley than gives it two 
functions; the understanding when it perceives ideas and the will when it produces them 
or makes them do anything. This divine mind and its functions of will and 
understanding together with the notion of substance or being in general cannot stand for 
an idea.153  
 
4.3 Anti-Abstractionism 
 
 In this section I shall look at the assumption by Berkeley, pointed out by Jesseph 
(which is mentioned in Chapter 3 of this thesis and derived from anti-abstractionism), 
that the imagination is derived from our sensations, and the underlying assumption that 
our mental faculties consist only of sense and imagination with no faculty for framing 
independent ideas through ‘pure intellect’, as well as the issue of Berkeley’s acceptance 
of other abstract mathematical entities.  
 
This actually goes beyond mathematical entities to the problem of thing of 
anything abstracted from its qualities, but it is perhaps in mathematics where the appeal 
to abstract away from properties it at its most self-evident. Berkeley’s argument for his 
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assumption that our mental faculties consist only of sense and imagination with no 
faculty for framing independent ideas through ‘pure intellect’ comes from his anti-
abstractionism and can be found in the first dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, 
when he talks of the impossibility of framing abstract ideas.154 This follows on from a 
discussion of the supposed distinction between perceived and actual extension and the 
question of whether the former can be taken to be a secondary quality, while the latter 
can be taken to be a primary one. (Berkeley argues in this work that there is in fact no 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities). Berkeley argues (via Philonous) 
that while mathematicians consider quantity removed from any other sensible quality, 
they are not in fact thinking of pure abstracted ideas of extension. He then introduces 
(via Hylas), the notion of ‘pure intellect’, asking if so called abstracted ideas (like pure 
extension) cannot be framed in this way. This notion is rejected by Berkeley. Firstly, 
figures and extension are originally perceived through our senses, by sense, which 
means that they don’t belong to pure intellect. Secondly, he argues that we cannot frame 
the idea of a figure abstracted from all sensible qualities, (qualities that we frame ideas 
of through our senses). That is to say that if we could frame abstract ideas they would 
have to be by dint of our senses, as we would only get to them via our perceptual 
experience, but we actually find that we can’t frame abstract ideas at all, because we 
just can’t abstract away the sensible qualities form our idea of an object.155 We can’t 
therefore conceive of extension, without thinking of it as the extension of some ‘thing’.     
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4.4 Other Mathematical Entities 
 
Berkeley’s views on the usefulness of imaginary numbers as discussed in the 
previous chapter may present a problem for the so-called metaphysical objection. If the 
nature of something not quite finite is at issue, then surely something that is a 
placeholder for a number not contained within the real numbers is as much of a 
problem. An imaginary number doesn’t change its value; it always represents the same 
value 5i is always the square route of -25 for example, but that would not appear to give 
it an ontological status while an infinitesimal lacks one. It may also be worthwhile to 
consider the other objections in light of the other two objections. I don’t think it is a 
problem for the logical objection for the very fact an imaginary number does always 
represent the same nominal value, so it won’t change its ‘value’ in the course of a proof, 
it will remain consistent unlike an infinitesimal which changes value from something 
(infinitely small) to nothing in the proof outlined in the previous chapter. With the 
compensation of errors thesis, again if the value of an imaginary number remains 
constant it is hard to see why a proof containing one would need to rely on  
compensating errors on the way shown by the proof that  
 
 The point about the usefulness of imaginary numbers comes from a discussion 
about the use of signs such as letters and mathematical symbols in the course of our 
lives (from within a boarder discussion about the relationship between science and 
religion). These signs are a means to suggest ideas to the mind although they don’t 
always, but when they do they are not of abstract ideas. When they don’t suggest ideas, 
they can still be helpful in allowing us to reach a conceived good. This is the case of 
imaginary numbers in an equation; they help us get the right answer, but don’t suggest 
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an idea. But here Berkeley also makes the point that mathematical sciences can fall 
short of the rigour they are thought to possess, and mistakenly think should also apply 
to the mysteries of religion.156  
 
This exploration of the context for Berkeley’s arguments in ‘The Analyst’ 
allows us to better understand Berkeley’s reasoning and motivations and enables us to 
appreciate the issues from their situation in history. It also helps us to see how these 
arguments fit into Berkeley’s wider philosophical picture. And it is not the case that 
Berkeley is saying we should abandon the calculus because of these objections, rather 
mathematicians need to mindful of the limitations of their discipline and not to assume 
that the discipline of religion should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny (as a certain 
degree of mystery is rightly part of  religion and the principles of Christianity. However, 
independently of these factors the objections Berkeley are well thought out, informed 
and worth taking seriously.157  
 
 While we have been pondering the ideas behind the understanding of the nature 
of mathematical entities for a long time, the developments in the field of philosophy of 
mathematics in the C20 and early C21 have brought different interpretations and ways 
of potentially explaining the true nature of mathematical entities that we find so 
indispensable to our lives. Berkley’s objections to the calculus are an interesting 
example of how in even early stages of modern infinitary mathematics the 
understanding of how to incorporate infinite quantities into mathematics raised 
questions, which feed into a broader concern about the nature of mathematical entities 
themselves. The calculus worked, but it raised questions as to why it worked, given its 
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lack of scientific rigour. Reconciling the issues surrounding Berkeley’s position 
(particularly of seeing the calculus as truth without science) may therefore be found in 
more current metaphysics of mathematics, as we still ask similar questions,  and this 
will be the focus of the next section. 
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5. Berkeley’s Objections and the Debate concerning Realism in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics:  
 
 Having considered Berkeley’s objections, I will proceed to examine them as a 
case-study in relation to the philosophical debate about realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics. While the arguments Berkeley has put forward in his objections are 
derived from external issues such as his philosophy of religion and his immaterialism, 
the objections, as previously stated are nevertheless well thought out and not easy to 
dismiss out of hand. Therefore, I shall take them on board as a serious worry for the 
notion that we can be realists about mathematical objects. In so doing I shall consider 
how these objections relate to three positions that are held by participants in the debate, 
and consider the impact they have on these positions. These are:  
 
Platonism – the realist idea that mathematical objects are abstract and have an 
independent existence. 
 
Fictionalism – the idea that mathematical objects don’t exist and are merely useful 
fictions, and therefore that statements which purport to be about them are not literally 
true. 
 
Truth-value Realism – an alternative version of realism that does not depend upon the 
actual existence of mathematical objects in order for statements which purport to be 
about them to be true.158  
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In this section I shall describe each position in turn, and briefly discuss how it may or 
may not help with overcoming Berkeley’s objections, before summing up and making 
the case for the metaphysical picture that may best succeed in doing so. 
  
5.1 Platonism: 
 
Mathematical platonism is a realist position within the philosophy of 
mathematics. Øystein Linnebo has defined mathematical platonism with the following 
three theses: 
 
There are mathematical objects.  
Mathematical objects are abstract.  
Mathematical objects are independent of intelligent agents, their language, thought and 
practices.159  
 
Platonism is not simply the view that Plato himself held, although it is inspired by his 
theory of abstract and eternal forms. Contemporary platonism, as characterised above is, 
unlike some older versions, standardly taken to be a purely metaphysical position. It 
excludes epistemological and modal claims that earlier definitions may have 
included.160  
 
                                                                                                                                         
Clarendon Press, 1990). Maddy has however subsequently changed her position. See her Defending the 
Axioms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
159 Øystein Linnebo, "Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/platonism-mathematics/ 
(Accessed 14 August 2016) 
160 Ibid 
 70 
According to Linnebo the most important argument for the first thesis comes 
from Frege and is put forward in the Foundations of Arithmetic, in which Frege 
attempts to analyse the concept of number. Linnebo sums up this argument, which can 
be found in sections §§26-27 and §§61-62 of the Foundations of Arithmetic.161 Frege 
argues that when we use mathematical language we talk as if we are referring to, and 
quantifying over, mathematical objects, and that many of our mathematical theorems 
are true. In addition, in order for a sentence to be true the sub-expressions contained 
within it must actually do what they purport to do. Therefore, mathematical objects 
must exist otherwise it would not be possible for the statements of mathematics to be 
true.162 So, according to Frege, when we accept that a mathematical proposition is true, 
the only way that it can be true is if the objects that the sentence is about actually exist.  
 
From this first thesis Linnebo argues that we can get to platonism by adding the 
abstractness and independence conditions. Abstractness, he suggests, can be added 
reasonably uncontroversially. For instance, we could add a constraint that we should 
avoid ascribing any features to mathematics that makes its practice inadequate or 
misguided. So, if we were to ascribe concreteness to mathematical objects we would 
regard the fact that mathematicians show no interest in the spatio-temporal location of 
these mathematical objects to be inadequate and misguided. This is because we expect 
that those who study particular concrete objects are concerned about those objects’ 
whereabouts. Zoologists, after all are concerned about the locations of the animals they 
study.163 Importantly, this notion of abstractness and concreteness is not the same as 
Berkley and what he is getting at in his anti-abstractionism. Berkeley’s notion of 
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abstract is the idea that we can’t perceive an object of any kind abstracted from its 
properties, as illustrated in ‘Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous’, and the 
human mind would be regarded as concrete albeit non-material. Whereas the platonist 
notion of abstract is that entities which exist, but we don’t ‘bump into’ in the material 
world must be abstract, that is to say non-concrete or non-physical. Hence, 
mathematical objects, if there are any, are abstract.  
 
Linnebo also argues that the independence thesis, ‘that mathematical objects, if 
there are any, are independent of intelligent agents, their language, thought and 
practices’,164 while maybe not as uncontroversial as the abstractness thesis, is tacitly 
accepted by most analytic philosophers (although objections to it have been raised by 
constructivists and intuitionists). This may not be a thesis that is loudly endorsed. In 
fact, its acceptance may come more from a worry that we don’t understand what it 
would really mean for the independence thesis to fail. Further, Linnebo believes that our 
conceptions of ordinary physical objects may provide the template for this tacit 
acceptance of the thesis.165 
 
Standard platonism deals with the question of infinity and accepts infinite 
numbers. Frege tells us that the truths of arithmetic and thus the natural numbers 
sequence can be derived by logic alone.166 And even the transfinite numbers discovered 
by Georg Cantor, shortly before Frege was writing, are accepted into the ontology. 
Frege argues that they too have been logically introduced and that we can quantify over 
them and refer to them in the same way as we do finite numbers by using the names and 
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symbols that are used for them in mathematics.167 Infinitesimals too are discussed, but 
they are an example that needs a little further explanation. Frege does not appear to take 
them to be an unsurmountable problem to his theory, but he does think that we lack a 
true idea of them. But he argues the we do sometimes even with ordinary physical 
objects lack a true idea of them, such as when we consider the Earth, but this does not 
mean that we don’t give the words we use to refer to such objects a meaning, or stop 
using the words. The problems arise when we try to consider the words in isolation and 
not in the context of an expression.168 When it comes to infinitesimals we can make 
sense of the equations such as df(x) = g(x)dx, but not be required to be able to draw a 
specific line segment to indicate the infinitesimal distance alluded to in the equation.169 
The notion of an infinitesimal then can still be understood as the word has meaning. But 
arguably this is not entirely satisfactory and may even reduce infinitesimals to a mere 
turn of phrase. 
 
Subsequently to Frege, a major argument for platonism was the Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument. This argues that mathematical sentences form an 
indispensable part of our empirical theories of the physical world, that we have good 
reasons for thinking that these empirical theories are true and therefore we have good 
reasons to think that our mathematical sentences are true.170 The position I shall 
consider in the next section, that of fictionalism, arose mainly in response to this 
argument. There have also been moves to preserve realism that recognise some of the 
objections to platonism. In the twentieth century, alternative varieties of realism began 
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to be put forward, and a non-platonist variety of realism, truth-value realism will be 
explored too. 
 
Berkeley clearly would have issues with platonism that come from his 
motivations for his arguments about the calculus, specifically his idealism, as well as 
those that derive from the arguments themselves. As we have seen, Berkeley had a 
thesis of anti-abstractionism and was at pains to show that there were no abstract ideas. 
A specific example showing how this relates to mathematical objects is his argument 
against Locke that we can form no general idea of a triangle. All our ideas of triangles 
come from our experiences of actual triangles that we perceive, and we are not able to 
abstract away from them. Specifically in order to form a general idea of a triangle it 
would have to come from our observations of triangles with various properties, and the 
abstract triangle would have to have all and none of these properties in order to be truly 
abstract. It would thus have to be ‘neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, 
equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once.’171 This even is framed in 
terms resonant of ‘fluxions’; being both something and nothing. When it comes to 
numbers themselves ideas of numbers for Berkeley, his view is at odds with the notion 
that numbers exit. They too cannot be abstracted away from ideas of the things that are 
numbered and can therefore not be framed in the abstract.172 The final premise would be 
rejected because under idealism nothing can have an existence independent of thought. 
Thus, for Berkeley, all three of the premises of platonism would be contested.  
 
Focusing on the arguments themselves, the obvious sticking point to platonism 
is going to be the very notion of infinite numbers and infinitesimals, and despite Frege’s 
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logicism and contextualisation which inform his platonism even he appears to recognise 
that infinitesimals are not quite so straightforward. Infinitesimals do appear to present a 
unique problem to platonism. So even if we accept the abstract nature of mathematical 
objects and further accept that numbers we can’t properly apprehend exist, as in the case 
of very large or transfinite numbers, there is a further concern with infinitesimals as 
used in the calculus in that they are in Berkeley’s view not quite something and not 
quite nothing. Here an objector would argue that the first premise, applied to 
infinitesimals, that they exist is going to be contradictory: we first imagine them to have 
a positive quantity and then imagine that quantity to be zero. The argument that we do 
get at truth is not going to be enough to compel us to accept platonism, when the road to 
truth relies on contradictory premises.  
 
This then raises questions for the truth we do arrive at when we use the calculus. 
Should we accept that statements made by using the calculus are not literally true, as in 
mathematical fictionalism? Or can the notion that we get literal truth be preserved by 
recourse to a version of realism that does not have the ontological demands of 
platonism? These positions must too be evaluated before a final conclusion is made.  
 
5.2 Fictionalism: 
 
Mathematical fictionalism is a metaphysical position that argues that 
mathematical objects do not exist, and thus statements that purport to be about them are 
not literally true. Instead talk of mathematical objects should be interpreted as 
concerned with useful fictions. This means that statements about them can only be true 
in the sense that statements about fictional characters are true. Hartry Field who 
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introduced modern fictionalism argues that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is not literally true. It is only true 
in the sense that the sentence ‘Oliver Twist lived in London’ is true. That is to say the 
statement about Oliver Twist is true only in the sense that it is true according to the story 
by Charles Dickens. In a similar way, the sum 2 + 2 = 4 is true only in the sense that it is 
true according to standard mathematics.173 As explained by Michèle Friend a fictionalist 
will accept standard mathematics but deny that mathematical objects exist. For a 
fictionalist standard mathematics is standard because it can be readily applied to the 
world, but this is not enough to warrant an ontological claim that mathematical entities 
exist.174 We have no more reason to believe in the independent existence of 
mathematical entities than we do fictional characters, so they are treated the same in 
terms of truth. 
 
Broadly speaking there are two varieties of fictionalism, a nominalisation, or 
‘hard-road’, version where recourse to mathematical objects is recast in non-
mathematical language, and a no-nominalisation, or ‘easy-road’ version in which we 
maintain reference to mathematical objects.175 As stated fictionalism was introduced by 
Field with reference to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, which states that 
talk of mathematical objects is indispensable to our scientific theories, because he saw it 
as the only serious argument for the existence of mathematical entities.176 But that does 
not preclude it being applied to other arguments for platonism. In his version of the 
indispensability argument Putnam argues that scientific language cannot be 
nominalised, i.e. it cannot be recast without recourse to abstract entities.177 
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Indispensability is therefore rooted in Putnam’s belief that nominalistic language is 
inadequate for science. He argues that being restricted to such a language would involve 
giving up most of mathematics due to the fact that mathematics presupposes the 
existence of abstract entities. 
 
Putnam gives a particular example of Newton’s law of gravitation. He argues 
that it presupposes certain things; the existence of forces, distances and masses as things 
that can be measured by real numbers. He explores the notion of using points, but he 
argues that we don’t really have a way of measuring the distances between these points 
without recourse to numbers. Numbers are therefore needed for us to understand the 
law.178 Field argues, contra Putnam, that empirical theories can be reformulated without 
recourse to abstract objects such as numbers, and he attempts the enterprise with the 
Newtonian gravitational theory.179 It is arguably not clear that Field’s nominalisation 
can fully achieve what it sets out to do. Friend argues that the expression of Newtonian 
mechanics that Field uses is still reliant on points, which as Putnam discovered need to 
be differentiated by numbers, so mechanics is not actually expressed without relying on 
numbers.180 It also raises issues of how hard it would be to establish more generally. To 
determine whether this nominalisation project really works it seems that we would need 
to carry it out for each of our empirical theories.  
 
In contrast the more recently developed type of fictionalism known as easy-road 
fictionalism sidesteps Putnam’s claims that scientific language cannot be nominalised 
and is therefore a no-nominalisation response. Balaguer who holds this kind of view 
thinks that mathematics functions as a descriptive or representational aid. It gives us an 
                                               
178 Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 36-43 
179 Science without Numbers, pp. 61-91 
180 Friend, p. 136 
 77 
easy way to make claims about the physical world, and our use of numbers in these 
claims gives us an easy way to describe such things as the temperature states of physical 
systems.181 We therefore have no need to dispense with mathematical entities, we just 
use them as tools to make science more comprehensible, but this is not the same as 
accepting that they exist. Mary Leng, in her brand of easy-road 
 fictionalism discusses how science utilises fictions in some theories and 
presents the argument that numbers could be playing a similar role.182  
  
On the face of it, fictionalism may offer a useful metaphysical account of 
infinitesimals under a Berkeleyan analysis of the calculus. There are two factors to this 
idea as a potential solution. Firstly, the objections themselves offer a comparison with 
fictionalism as a general position, and secondly the project to redevelop the calculus 
without infinitesimals, suggested by Berkeley has some similarities with the hard-road 
version of fictionalism.  
 
Taking the objections themselves, if we consider the best argument for the 
compensation of errors thesis, for example, detailed in section 3.3 of this thesis, 
Berkeley argues that we get at truth, but not science. For him truth is reached in the long 
term only because two erroneous steps in the process cancel each other out, as both 
utilise quantities that are too large by the same value. Therefore, although the final 
result is true, true claims have not been made at every step of the proof. Perhaps these 
steps could be thought of as useful fictions that get us the right result. But this approach 
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182 Mary Leng, ‘Truth, Fiction and Stipulation’ in New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul 
Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity, ed. by Fabrice Pataut, (Springer) Forthcoming, available at: 
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may be at odds with aspects of the relationship between fictionalism and science which 
will be explored when the three approaches presented in this section are evaluated.  
 
 The suggestion that the calculus of Newton and Leibniz may be redeveloped 
without the use of infinitesimals is echoed in Field’s project of reformulating Newton’s 
gravitational laws without recourse to numbers. As previously stated, the nominalisation 
of infinitesimals in the calculus would not amount to full fictionalism of mathematics, 
because mathematical objects would remain in other branches of mathematics, and even 
within the calculus itself. However, the nominalisation of a fundamental element of the 
calculus, namely the use of infinitesimals could serve to render the calculus as 
fictionalist as a whole. Under such a scenario its methodology would be reliant on the 
inclusion of entities we take to be fictional, and would have been demonstrated to be 
useful tools for getting the right results, without being a direct road to truth. This would 
serve to preclude a realist view of the calculus, and it may enable a Berkeleyan to be a 
fictionalist about the calculus, but a realist about mathematics in general. (This would of 
course mean that the Berkeleyan would have to adhere to a non-platonist form of 
realism, i.e. one that did not require them to postulate the actual existence of 
mathematical objects, and, as we shall see in the discussion of truth-value realism, such 
possibilities exist, that is not to say that truth-value realism is the only non-platonist 
realism available.) It is interesting, for instance, to note that a non-platonist version of 
realism could be made compatible with idealism, as the immaterial nature of numbers 
does not present an obvious problem to an idealist picture, wherein nothing we 
experience is material.  
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However, such an enterprise as described would be open to similar charges as 
Field’s nominalisation process. Berkeley was able to nominalise a small portion of the 
calculus along classical lines for the proofs he utilised in ‘The Analyst’, specifically for 
problems in the theory of conic sections. However, we don’t know if such a programme 
is possible across the calculus as a whole. It also seems unlikely that any attempt will 
ever be made. Hard-road fictionalism has fallen out of favour as a way of solving these 
kinds of metaphysical problems, so it is difficult to imagine anyone prepared to take up 
the challenge for a smaller branch of mathematics, and which would do little to help 
broaden the nominalisation of mathematics more generally. Further, the direction in 
which the calculus was developed, first by using the notion of limits and then with real 
analysis, has removed any potential need to worry about recasting it along the classical 
lines such that Berkeley suggested.  
 
Fictionalism may appear to have something to offer the Berkeleyan, but some of 
the issues identified here indicate that a realist picture, which can tackle Berkeley’s 
objections, particularly one that can be non-platonist in nature, would still be the 
preferred option. I now therefore turn to a metaphysical picture that can be presented as 
non-platonist, that of truth-value realism, in order to assess if it can tackle the 
objections.   
 
5.3 Truth-Value Realism: 
 
Truth-value realism holds that every well-formed mathematical statement has a 
unique and objective truth-value that is independent of whether it can be known. 
Importantly this view gives no ontological viewpoint and thus is not dependent on the 
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existence thesis in platonism, and on its own does not hold it. The independence thesis, 
which truth-value realism preserves, then relates to mathematical statements, which 
have independent truth-values. Without the existence thesis truth-value realism is not a 
form of platonism, but the theory can become a form of platonism by adding the 
existence thesis.183  
 
Linnebo tells us that truth-value realism involves a mathematical language and a 
philosophical language, so there is no contradiction between a mathematician asserting 
the existence of mathematical objects and a philosopher denying it. Someone who holds 
this view can then say that a statement that refers to the existence of abstract entities is 
true in the mathematical language, but the assertion that there are no mathematical 
objects is made in the philosophical language. The statements in the mathematical 
language are then translated into the philosophical language.184 Shapiro describes these 
‘translations’ as a systematic way of interpreting mathematical language, so that it does 
not reference mathematical objects, but grants that mathematical sentences preserve 
their standard truth-values.185 Truth-value realism comes in different varieties and has 
no one formulation. Thus, there are different philosophical languages available. Truth-
value realism may give an account of how mathematical sentences can be true, but it 
differs widely from platonism in that it can be used in systems that deny mathematical 
objects exist.  
 
                                               
183 Linnebo. Although we might naturally assume that platonism entails truth-value realism Linnebo tells 
us that neither view in fact entails the other; platonism does not rule out the possibility of indeterminacy 
in mathematical statements. 
184 Ibid 
185 Shapiro, p.227 
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I shall focus on the variety of truth-value realism developed by Charles Chihara 
in his book, Constructibility and Mathematical Existence.186 The purpose of the focus 
on Chihara is not to endorse one particular form of truth-value realism, but rather to 
briefly present a system within the position, in order that we can gain an understanding 
of how the truth of mathematical statements may be accepted without any recourse to 
the existence of mathematical objects. Hellman’s structuralism could equally have 
provided the template.187 Interestingly both offer a modal approach to mathematical 
statements.    
  
 Chihara is presented by Shapiro as an ontological anti-realist. That is to say that 
he is anti-realist about the existence of mathematical objects. (Mathematical ontological 
anti-realism does not in itself have to deny the existence of mathematical objects, it can 
merely be agnostic about it, and this explains why Linnebo argues that the existence 
claim of platonism can be added to the position). In his project Chihara replaces talk of 
sets with talk of open sentences. For instance, the English sentence ‘x is a sloth’ is an 
open sentence which is satisfied by Gallina, who is a sloth living in Colchester Zoo. An 
open sentence is one in which a singular term gets replaced by a variable, and in this 
example the singular term, or name, ‘Gallina’ has been replaced by the variable x.188 
Gallina satisfies this sentence because it is true of Gallina that she is a sloth, and it is 
this relationship of ‘true of’ between objects and open sentences which is described as 
satisfaction. Using Chihara’s approach we would replace talk of the set of all sloths with 
talk about the open sentence ‘x is a sloth’. However, no natural language contains 
enough open sentences to cover all mathematical objects, so Chihara focuses on the 
possibility of writing open sentences, where such possibilities are not limited to all of 
                                               
186 Charles S. Chihara, Constructibility and Mathematical Existence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 
187 See Geoffrey Hellman, Mathematics Without Numbers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 
188 Chihara, p. 41 
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our natural languages. That is to say he employs modality.189 Specifically Chihara 
utilises the Kripkean semantics of possible worlds, but he explains that this is intended 
as a heuristic device, and that this is not intended to actually be foundational to his 
theory.190 
 
 Since Chihara accepts Quine’s notion of ontological commitment for the 
ordinary quantifiers of first order logic (" and $) but disputes it when applied to 
mathematical objects,191 his programme begins with the introduction of a 
‘constructibility’ quantifier (C) which formally behaves like the existential quantifier, so 
if f is a formula then (Cx)f is a formula, read as ‘it is possible to construct an x such 
that f’, or ‘it is possible that there be an x such that f’. Chihara introduces a system of 
languages, L and L* in Chapter 2, and Lt in Chapter 4. L is a language based on the 
first-order language of Benson Mates in Elementary Logic, with a modal semantics to 
accommodate the constructability quantifiers. In L the only quantifiers are the 
constructability quantifiers. L* is a development of L in which both ordinary and 
constructability quantifiers are accommodated which finally leads to the more complex 
Lt in which his which the full constructability theory is developed.192   
 
 The constructability quantifier does not carry ontological commitment. As 
Shapiro points out this appears to be a common-sense approach.193 (Although 
presumably it will carry a commitment to the possibility of the examples that we 
employ.) We don’t, however, take talk about the possibility that something, say a house, 
can be constructed in a particular spot to include an assertion that such a house exists, or 
                                               
189 Shapiro, pp. 239-240  
190 Chihara, p. 25 
191 Chihara, p.53 
192 Chihara, pp. 25-37, 55-58 
193 Shapiro, p. 240 
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even that an abstract object such as a ‘possible house’ exists.194 This is a weaker claim 
given by the constructability quantifiers, one which the ordinary quantifiers already 
make about objects that do actually exist, for to exist entails the possibility of existence. 
The account can therefore maintain its ontological neutrality but in line with Linnebo’s 
characterisation the existence thesis can be added to turn it into platonism, if, for 
example, we assume that possibility implies existence. Chihara argues that the literalist 
(which includes, but is not limited to, the platonist) may believe what they do about the 
existence of mathematical objects precisely because mathematical language is 
standardly analysed in terms of the ordinary quantifiers of first order logic (which is a 
crucial part of Frege’s logicism), meaning that they are analysed to assert the actual 
existence of mathematical objects.195 This observation is clearly motivating Chihara to 
introduce his alternative quantifiers which don’t get analysed in this literal way.  
 
 Chihara introduces the language Lt, in which his theory will be developed.196 
His theory, Ct, he describes as a simple type theory.197 Therefore following type theory, 
Lt has infinitely many sorts of variables. These begin with level 0 variables which range 
over ordinary objects like sloths and houses and are bound by our standard universal 
and existential quantifiers. The constructability quantifiers are introduced at level 1, 
whose variables range over the open sentences satisfied by ordinary objects, ‘x is a 
sloth’ etc. These variables can only be bound by constructability quantifiers, and these 
open sentences correspond to sets. The language makes no provision for existing open 
sentences, all open sentences are merely considered possible (Shapiro’s emphasis). If 
we wanted to linguistically pick out a specific object that any natural language lacks the 
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195 Chihara, pp. 3-4 
196 Chihara, pp. 55-58 
197 Chihara, p. 43 
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resources to do, we imagine an expansion of that language that gives us the resources to 
do so. Level 2 variables range over open sentences that are satisfied by level 1 open 
sentences, which correspond to sets of sets, and so on.198  
 
 We can explain levels 1 and 2 in the following way. Suppose I have several 
pairs of earrings in my jewellery box. On level 1 I might want to pick out one earring in 
a pair, so I could say x is an earring that is one of the rightmost pair in my jewellery 
box. If I take c to be the one on the left, instead of thinking of it as a member of the set 
that forms that pair of earrings I would think of it as satisfying the given open sentence 
‘x is an earring from the rightmost pair of earrings in my jewellery box’. When we 
move to level 2 whose open sentences correspond to sets of sets (e.g. the set of pairs of 
earrings in my jewellery box), we would use an open sentence like ‘a is an open 
sentence describing two matched earrings in my jewellery box’. Here the open sentence 
is in the range of level 2 variables because the variable a is of level 1. These level 2 
variables are again bound by constructability quantifiers.199  
 
 But unlike the nominalisation approaches of fictionalism, Chihara is not 
attempting to revise mathematics. He is still aiming to ensure true statements of 
contemporary mathematics come out as actually true. His system grants impredicative 
definitions at each level. Shapiro explains:  
 
If F(a) is any formula in which the level 1 variable a occurs free, there 
is an axiom asserting that it is possible to construct an open sentence (of 
level 2) which is satisfied by all and only the level 1 open sentences that 
would satisfy F(a) (if only they existed).200 
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This impredicativity is argued for by Chihara due to the nature of the modality 
involved. Shapiro accepts that the system Chihara developed has some similarity 
with ordinary type theory, but he argues that there are important differences. If, 
using type theory a mathematician proves the sentence ‘there is a type 3 set x 
such that F(x)’then the type theorist is presupposing the existence of a set of sets 
of sets. But in Chihara’s system, his equivalent sentence instead has the form ‘it 
is possible to construct a level 3 open sentence s such that F*(s)’.   
 
After presenting the theory Ct, Chihara uses the approach to develop 
mathematics such as arithmetic and analysis, similarly to the way they are 
developed in simple type theory.201 
 
 Shapiro points out that Chihara’s brand of truth-value realism is a 
nominalist position. This is of course something it has in common with 
fictionalism. However, unlike fictionalism, it accepts the actual truth of 
mathematical sentences and does not categorise them as merely useful fictions. 
But it does not accept the independent existence of mathematical objects. The 
sentences come out true, but only because they can be reformulated along the 
lines of open sentences. The possibility of construction gives these sentences 
their truth, rather than an ontological commitment to the actual existence of any 
mathematical objects.  
  
                                               
201 Chihara, pp. 80-121 
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 Chihara’s truth-value realism can give us a principle asserting the 
possibility of constructing infinitely many objects. As the approach is fully 
equipped to deal with the infinite (as demonstrated in terms of the infinitely 
large of set theory), it should also be able to deal with the infinitely small, giving 
us infinitesimals as a merely possible construction; so sentences that utilise them 
come out true, but to refer to one is not to presuppose its existence, although this 
language may not be that straightforward to formulate. Assuming that this can 
be overcome, it remains a theoretical possibility that allows us to get to the truth 
of certain mathematical statements. However, it is not clear that this will solve 
the objection of inconsistency that arises from the use of infinitesimals in 
Newtonian or Leibnizian calculus whereby the distances are postulated first to 
have a positive quantity and then presented as being zero, at different stages in 
certain proofs. There are also some issues again which would be problematic for 
Berkeley’s motivations for his objections; namely that the statements of 
mathematics exist independently.202 The position is therefore in conflict with the 
mind-dependence of immaterialism.  
 
 I shall in the next section end this chapter by evaluating how these three 
positions might relate to Berkeley’s objections and determining if any of them 
can explain the success of the calculus in view of the objections.   
 
 
 
                                               
202 It is of course the case that in some theories the notion of construction depends on a mind being able to 
do the constructing, but in this instance because we are only dealing with the possibility of construction 
and owing to the iterative nature of the type theory that Chihara employs, this restriction would appear 
not to be in place here, allowing the independence thesis to be reached.   
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5.4 Analysis of the Metaphysical Positions in Relation to Berkeley: 
 
I will consider the metaphysical accounts discussed in this chapter both in terms 
of the arguments that motivate Berkeley’s objections and in terms of the objections 
themselves. The second considerations are the more important, as the validity of these 
objections has been the primary focus of this thesis. However, it seems to me that in the 
pursuit of a deeper review of Berkeley’s philosophy of mathematics, the question of 
whether Berkeley’s broader philosophical outlook presents a problem for these 
metaphysical positions is of interest.  
Firstly, it is important to remember that even the inventors of the calculus had 
concerns about the precise nature of infinitesimals and fluxions. As noted, Leibniz 
thought of infinitesimals as a useful façon de parler. This would perhaps best accord 
with a fictionalist metaphysical account of mathematical entities. Mikhail G. Katz and 
David Sherry argue as much, taking Leibniz’s own description of infinitesimals as 
mental fictions in a letter to Des Bosses dated 1706, as a justification for their 
viewpoint. The fictional nature that Leibniz attributed to infinitesimals is described by 
them as giving them an ideal ontological status along the lines of complex numbers.203   
It has also been pointed out that Newton made suggestions for the elimination of 
infinitesimals by considering them as limits, which is of course an approach that was 
taken later in the development of the calculus. However, the proofs of his calculus that 
Newton develops and which have been presented in this thesis as the targets of 
Berkeley’s objections still utilise fluxions.  
 
                                               
203 Mikhail G. Katz and David Sherry, ‘Leibniz’s Infinitesimals: Their Fictionality, Their Modern 
Implementations, and Their Foes from Berkeley to Russell and Beyond’, Erkenntnis 78, 571–625, p. 572-
576 
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5.4.1 The Motivations in Relation to the Metaphysical Positions: 
 
Platonism is plainly at odds with Berkeley’s idealism. The first and third thesis 
do not hold for idealism. The existence of numbers is problematic in that they don’t 
exist in their own right only in relation to ideas of objects that employ the concept. 
Independence is also a problem according to Berkeley, nothing can exist independently 
of a mind, and God who gives everything existence is described as a mind—an infinite 
mind, but a mind nevertheless. Numbers then cannot be mind-independent. This would 
mean that the second thesis that numbers, if they exist, are abstract (in the sense 
employed by platonism rather than a Berkeleyan sense), would be at best vacuously true 
given the status of premise one. 
 
Fictionalism fares better here, in that numbers don’t exist on their own for 
Berkeley and they don’t exist at all for fictionalism. They are just part of the story for 
the fictionalist, and only can be perceived when they are part of the idea of something 
else for Berkeley. So there appears to be no inherent problem with postulating 
fictionalism as a method of dealing with mathematical entities in Berkeley’s idealism.  
 
Truth-value realism as a general position is agnostic on existence, however 
Chihara’s version of truth-value approach does appear to eschew the idea that 
mathematical objects do actually exist. The existence claim can be added to truth-value 
realism, so there is nothing inherently wrong with a truth-value realist position that 
allows non-abstract mathematical objects to exist as an idea. As the theory in general 
terms is agnostic on the existence of numbers, then this does not present an obvious 
problem. But we would still have to overcome the independence thesis, and truth-value 
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realism would still be faced with the same objections to the independence thesis as 
platonism.  
 
5.4.2 The Objections in Relation to the Metaphysical Positions: 
 
Platonism as a metaphysical picture is not going to be a suitable means for 
dealing with the infinitesimals of the calculus. In a sense it is key to the problem. 
Although platonism as we understand it had not been formalised at the time Newton and 
Leibniz were developing the calculus, mathematical practice was undertaken, and to a 
large extent still is, as if mathematical objects do exist, at least while mathematics is 
being carried out. Mathematical objects are utilised because they are needed for the 
work of mathematicians. Today we call this working platonism. But as Shapiro points 
out this is simply a theory of how mathematics is, and should be, done and is in fact 
silent on ontology.204 However this tacit presupposition about the existence of 
mathematical objects appears to be at play in Berkeley’s programme. And it is therefore 
against this backdrop that the logical and metaphysical objections of incoherence that 
Berkeley finds in the use of infinitesimals in the calculus are brought to bear. Two 
aspects of the nature of infinitesimals are problematic for platonism. In the first instance 
the very notion of something existing that is infinitely small is difficult to quantify. In 
other words, platonism can’t overcome the metaphysical objections. In the second, the 
problem of assuming infinitesimals to have a quantity and then for them to have a value 
of zero at different points in a proof presents itself as a hard metaphysical position to 
hold, especially when that position is taken to presuppose existence. Therefore, it also 
can’t overcome the logical objections. Whether or not it can cope with the compensation 
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of errors thesis is left undetermined. There is nothing built into the theory that is 
specifically equipped to deal with this objection, but it is not obviously precluded either.  
 
Moving on to Fictionalism, it can defeat the metaphysical objections, simply by 
holding that mathematical objects don’t exist. The question of the logical objection is 
more complex and may be dependent on the particular type of fictionalism employed. 
Fictionalism treats mathematics like a ‘story’, but the sentences of the ‘story’ would 
include some claims that are contradictory, again by assuming infinitesimals to have a 
quantity and then for them to have a value of zero at different points in the ‘story’. 
While fiction does not have to be consistent, (although arguably we prefer our stories 
not to contain plot holes) the stories of mathematics, in so far as they are supposed to be 
similar to mathematics would presumably be best thought to be consistent. However, 
the fictionalism of Mary Leng (as we shall see) may be able to sidestep this objection. 
Berkeley’s claims that the calculus can get at truth but not science is also important for 
considering an appropriate metaphysical picture, and here fictionalism is in the 
strongest position. There is some resonance with the easy-road fictionalism of Mary 
Leng, in which she accepts that science itself contains some useful fictions, generally 
idealisations of how things would behave in perfect circumstances.205 But her arguments 
have a key difference. She accepts the fictions as part of science. Science then is true, in 
so far as it can be, in spite of the inclusion of fictions. The contrast between truth and 
science is not being made. Berkeley argues that the truth that we get in the 
compensation of errors thesis is due to the two errors which me make in certain proofs 
of the calculus. These would be analogous to the fictions which are the stipulations that 
Leng cites. But for Berkeley it’s precisely the presence of these fictions that mean that 
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the calculus is not science. This may be an indication that easy-road fictionalism is not a 
suitable match. The hard-road version of fictionalism first proposed by Hartry Field, of 
course, does have some similarities with Berkeley’s proposal to nominalise the calculus. 
But, as has been argued earlier in this chapter, hard-road fictionalism faces strong 
objections that would have to be overcome before it could seriously be put forward as a 
solution. 
 
Truth-value realism too has an interesting relationship with Berkeley’s 
suggestion for nominalising the calculus because it nominalises mathematical language. 
Further, in order for it to be a successful candidate, that nominalisation would have to 
include infinitesimals. However, as an approach truth-value realism has in place the 
capacity to handle infinity, through its ability to recast set theory in terms of open 
sentences. Thus, dealing with infinitesimals should not prove too much of a challenge. 
Of course, we would be transferring our language from talk of the infinitely big to talk 
of the infinitely small but it is not obvious that this cannot be done. Truth-value realism 
therefore overcomes the metaphysical objections. It can talk about infinitesimals 
without having to make a claim that they actually exist. The logical objections, 
however, are not overcome. As a linguistic approach, truth-value realism means that 
some of the sentences in some of the proofs are inconsistent, so the proofs will contain 
two contradictory premises. Therefore, there remains a worry that we end up saying 
something both exists and doesn’t. Truth-value realism may be able to account for open 
sentences of the form ‘x is an infinitesimal’ but it would probably still struggle to 
explain how x is a quantity and x is nothing. It is not clear that there is another way to 
recast the language in a way that can deal with sentences that contain the two 
contradictory claims. Perhaps the suggested existence of infinitesimals themselves 
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would cease to be a problem, but the sentences in the proofs still prove to be 
problematic by dint of the contradictions. This issue is not easily solvable using an 
approach that depends upon nominalism. Again, as with platonism, there is nothing in 
the theory that specifically deals with the compensation of errors thesis, so it Is not clear 
if truth-value realism overcomes it either. 
 
Berkeley’s philosophical landscape, specifically his idealism, is at odds with all 
the metaphysical positions we have considered. Further, his objections in ‘The Analyst’ 
do show up the issues that platonism has in dealing with quantities such as 
infinitesimals, when we set his motivations aside. The first thesis that mathematical 
objects exist is deeply problematic in the case of infinitesimals. Approaches that 
countenance the nominalism, as opposed to the nominalisation,206 of infinitesimals, 
either by describing them as fictional entities or by expressing the literal truth in a new 
formal language, provide a way of denying their actual existence, while still 
appreciating the veracity of the results derived from their use. However, the two-step 
process in the proofs, whereby infinitesimals have a quantity which is also taken to be 
zero, and the objections Berkeley raises to that process are not overcome by this 
approach.  
 
Perhaps all this demonstrates why Berkeley’s objections have the resonance that 
they do. It appears that they stand up against the major metaphysical viewpoints that try 
to explain the nature of mathematical entities, even today.  
                                               
206 This refers to the distinction that Balaguer makes between nominalism and nominalisation. 
Nominalism is just the belief that mathematical objects should be replaced ontologically with alternatives 
whether we take the language of mathematics to be the correct one or not. Nominalisation on the other 
hand suggests that there should be an alternative language constructed that allows us to make the same 
statements that we make when we use mathematical language. Nominalisation approaches include Field’s 
hard-road fictionalism and Berkeley’s suggestion for a geometric language for the calculus. Leibniz’s 
view of infinitesimals as a façon de parler would I think be nominalism, but not nominalisation. 
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Fortunately, the progression from infinitesimals to real analysis in the 
methodology of the calculus means that we have options that can account for how we 
arrive at truth when we employ the calculus today. For modern calculus, we can take an 
easy-road fictionalist approach, if we are so motivated, or, if we want to argue that a 
form of realism can be employed, real-analysis has been translated into Lt, the language 
introduced by Chihara.207 We can’t after all, it seems, present a metaphysical picture 
that solves the past problems of the calculus, even with a more developed metaphysical 
picture that we have today, unless it does prove possible to nominalise the 17th century 
calculus. Some of our understanding of why the Newtonian and Leibnizian calculus 
worked would appear to remain philosophically mysterious 
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6. Conclusion: 
 
In the course of this thesis I have considered the calculus of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries from a historical and philosophical viewpoint. In the discussion of 
the history of the calculus and the priority dispute we have seen how, in the course of 
this dispute, each participant accused the other of plagiarism and attempted to inflict 
some damage on his rival’s reputation. In part this behaviour was symptomatic of the 
way science was practised and the way in which people were credited with scientific 
discoveries, prior to the acceptance of the phenomenon of convergence. But the levels 
of bitterness on both sides, the attention the dispute received and the prevalence of so 
much documentation of it, both at the time, and subsequently, also highlights how 
significant the mathematical discovery was, and how important the calculus is to 
modern mathematics.  This significance is a reason that we should take objections to it 
seriously. Even though the methodology of the calculus may have developed in such a 
way that means these problems may no longer arise in the calculus as practised today, 
the calculus as it was practised then still yielded true results. Understanding how this is 
so is therefore an important endeavour. 
 
To that end, I have highlighted key objections which were introduced by 
Berkeley and particularly focused on the use of infinitesimals in the calculus. These 
objections raise philosophical questions which are still central to the debates in the 
metaphysics of mathematics, in particular, what metaphysical picture can best explain 
the ontological status of mathematical objects, and how, and in what sense mathematics 
is true. These objections, as we have seen, are of three types; metaphysical objections, 
logical objections and a compensation of errors thesis. Broadly, the metaphysical 
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objections can be taken to be concerned with the nature of the objects of the calculus, 
infinitesimals. Berkeley takes their nature to be inconceivable, arguing that we can’t 
conceive of increments of space and time before they become finite. These objections 
appear to be based on at least an implicit understanding of realism in mathematics. As 
other metaphysical positions have subsequently been put forward, these objections 
remain the easiest to defuse.  
 
The logical objections argue that some of the proofs of the calculus treat an 
infinitesimal as both having and lacking a quantity. Certain premises within these proofs 
assume that an infinitesimal has a quantity, while others assume that that quantity is 
zero. Therefore, as the proof relies on the two contradictory premises, it must be flawed. 
This remains the most intractable objection.  
 
The compensation of errors thesis argues that the calculus only yields true 
results due to the fact that there are two compensating errors in some of the proofs, 
which cancel each other out in the course of the calculations of the proof. For this 
reason, Berkeley argues that the calculus can get at truth, but not science. The 
overcoming of this objection is harder to determine, as only one position appears 
obviously equipped to handle an objection of this sort.  
 
The objections have been considered in relation to three major theories of the 
twentieth and twenty- first centuries from the debate about realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics; platonism, fictionalism and truth-value realism. First, each position is 
explained, and then the question of infinity and infinitesimals is considered in relation 
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to the position. Each position is then assessed to see if it can overcome the three major 
objections.   
 
Platonism fails to overcome both the metaphysical and logical objections. The 
nature of infinitesimals presents a unique problem to platonism, and here more than 
anywhere we can see how the metaphysical and logical objections are interlinked. 
Berkeley argues in the logical objections that the proofs do assume at one stage that an 
infinitesimal has a certain positive quantity and later assume that it has a quantity of 
zero. This, as well as the notion of something infinitely small, in itself makes 
infinitesimals very difficult to quantify and conceive. Platonism is also one of the two 
positions that doesn’t directly deal with the compensation of errors thesis.  
 
Fictionalism overcomes the metaphysical objection by holding that 
mathematical objects don’t exist. However, it is not clear that all fictionalists can defeat 
the logical objections. Fictionalism treats mathematics like a ‘story’, but the ‘story’ then 
contains some claims that are contradictory. It is, though, the only position that, at least 
in some forms, has a method to overcome the compensation of errors thesis directly, by 
observing that in scientific theories we actually utilise theses that we know not to be 
literally true. Thus, on this score at least, it also directly argues against Berkeley’s 
argument that the calculus is not science.  
 
Truth-value realism overcomes the metaphysical objections as it does not 
depend upon the existence of mathematical objects. Further the particular version of 
truth-value realism considered in this thesis appears to take it that they don’t exist. The 
logical objections, however, are not overcome. As a linguistic approach, truth-value 
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realism means that some of the sentences in some of the proofs are inconsistent, so the 
proofs will contain two contradictory premises. It is less clear whether the compensation 
of errors thesis can be handled, as the position makes no obvious provision for it.  
 
In each case at least some of the objections have held up. The metaphysical 
objections may be solved by two of the options, but the logical objections appear to 
remain unresolved by all three approaches, and as stated, the compensation of errors 
thesis remains at best unanswered by two of them. This highlights the potency of 
Berkeley’s arguments, and the difficulty we still have in explaining why the calculus 
worked, and derived true results, when it was first introduced. The robustness of 
Berkeley’s arguments indicates that these three theories of contemporary mathematical 
metaphysics cannot fully deal with all the objects that are, and have been, used by 
mathematicians. In order to provide a theory that can account for all mathematical 
objects and answer the specific question of how we can explain that the calculus enables 
us to derive useful results, we need to look further to develop one of these positions, or 
perhaps to find a new metaphysical position altogether. 
 
As a secondary concern, in order to contextualise the objections, Berkeley’s 
motivations for raising the objections to the calculus have been examined, namely his 
concern about the arguments of at least one mathematician that the principles of 
Christianity are incoherent, and his immaterialism. The three approaches to the 
metaphysics have been analysed in terms of his immaterialism, and only fictionalism 
has been found to be compatible with it. 
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Finally, it remains to address the questions I presented in section 3.4 of the 
thesis, to assess whether the modern metaphysical analysis has been able to offer any 
answers:  
 
If Berkeley’s philosophical arguments are valid, how can we explain that 
the calculus enables us to derive useful results?  
 
This is at the centre of the enquiry and remains elusive. At least some of 
Berkeley’s arguments have been shown to be valid, and have been able to withstand our 
best contemporary theories in the metaphysics of mathematics. The fact that we have 
been unable to resolve the objections satisfactorily, in particular the logical objections, 
means that there is still an explanatory gap preventing us from fully giving an account 
of how the calculus worked. Perhaps this helps to demonstrate why the calculus evolved 
in a way that it did, moving away from the use of infinitesimals as understood in the 
early modern period. (This sets aside the modern use of infinitesimals, which as we 
have seen uses a different approach, and is taken by Jesseph to sidestep the 
compensation of errors thesis.)208    
 
If we do, or can, rely on non-entities for our mathematical proofs, does this 
mean that platonism cannot be the true metaphysical picture?  
 
It would appear that the use of infinitesimals in the calculus of the early modern 
period does present a problem for platonism. The notion of a quantity that is not quite 
something and not quite nothing, or is infinitesimally small, is hard to grasp as an 
                                               
208 Jesseph, p. 205 
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existent entity. This makes appealing the attempt to find an explanation of mathematical 
truth that is not platonist.    
 
Do modern mathematical solutions where we can generate proofs that may 
not depend on non-entities render the question moot?  
 
As discussed in section 3.3, Jesseph argues that to appeal to modern 
mathematics would be an anachronistic approach that does not fairly attempt to address 
the objections that Berkeley raised.209 Therefore we cannot dodge the objections by 
saying that they don’t arise when we practice the calculus today.  
 
 It may be asked that if we cannot look to modern mathematics for the answers 
to Berkeley’s objections, then can we really be justified in appealing to twentieth and 
twenty-first century metaphysics in pursuit of a means to overcome these same 
objections? I would argue that the anachronism of using contemporary mathematics 
derives from an approach that would develop the mathematics in such a way as to 
sidestep the objections rather than meet them. The application of metaphysics does not 
take this approach. It tries to deal with the mathematics on its own terms, and instead 
takes the position that it may be possible to reconcile the fact that the early calculus 
worked with the situation that there are legitimate questions to be asked about its 
methodology. In this sense the problem can be treated as if we are trying to fill an 
explanatory gap between the use of a successful mathematical system and our full 
understanding of how the system works. The fact that the system may have been 
subsequently developed in such a way that we no longer have to worry about the issues 
                                               
209 Ibid 
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that Berkeley raised does not detract from the fact that the system worked in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a way that makes such objections pertinent. Nor 
does it preclude the resolution of questions from the early modern age by modern 
developments in philosophical enquiry.   
 
Can we have a position whereby we believe that any mathematical truth 
can in principle be justified without recourse to non-entities, even if such 
alternatives are to be developed with the tools of future mathematics?  
 
On the face of it modern calculus provides an example that could be in line with 
this claim. If we are not fictionalists and we accept the literal truth of mathematics, we 
could point to the fact that we have rid the calculus of the necessity of recourse to non-
entities such as infinitesimals and fluxions. However, this approach is unconvincing for 
two reasons. Firstly, a theory cannot be based on one example, so other instances 
besides the calculus would have to be found. Secondly, this again is an anachronistic 
approach that relies upon modern mathematics to diffuse a philosophical issue from an 
earlier time. 
 
What is the nature of such seeming non-entities as fluxions and 
infinitesimals? And how do they play a role in our understanding of mathematical 
truths?   
 
The question of the nature of these seeming non-entities is still not fully 
resolved. The notion that they could be abstract independently existing entities in line 
with platonism is not an easy position to maintain. An answer may be best pursued by 
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looking towards a different metaphysical picture. Fictionalism and truth-value realism 
go some way to showing how we might approach the question of their nature, by 
essentially agreeing with Leibniz that they are façons de parler. As shown by the 
attempts in this thesis to explain how we understand mathematical truths in light of the 
objections to the calculus and its use of infinitesimals the second of these questions 
remains somewhat mysterious.     
 
If all this, however, leads us to conclude that platonism is in fact the wrong 
picture of mathematical objects, does the dependence upon non-entities in these 
proofs mean that all forms of mathematical realism are off the table, or is this 
methodology consistent with non-platonic forms of mathematical realism such as 
truth-value realism?  
 
We have in the course of this thesis concluded that platonism is the wrong 
picture of mathematical objects, but this does not in and of itself preclude other forms of 
mathematical realism from offering possible alternatives. Truth-value realism fares 
slightly better in that it can see off the metaphysical objections by denying the need for 
mathematical objects to exist. However, it cannot refute the logical objections, and 
possibly not the compensation of errors thesis either. 
 
Must we look to an alternative picture, such as fictionalism? 
 
 Fictionalism does appear to come out strongest in the debate, because as well as 
being able to overcome the metaphysical objections, some varieties of easy-road 
fictionalism clearly do have a mechanism for overcoming the compensation of errors 
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thesis. Further, it is in accord with at least one interpretation of how Leibniz saw the 
calculus. However, it still does not obviously overcome the logical objections. All of 
this means that more work will have to be done in order for us to be able to 
satisfactorily answer all of Berkley’s objections, and for us to fully understand the 
mysteries of the early modern calculus and the infinite in early modern philosophy.  
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